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Key facts
£52.7bn
Total costs reported for 
the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (CJRS) 
and the Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme 
(SEISS) up to 20 
September 2020
£69.7bn
Combined total forecast 
spend for CJRS and fi rst 
two grants of SEISS 
£3.9bn
HM Revenue & Customs’ 
(HMRC’s) upper estimate 
of fraud and error on 
CJRS to 20 September, 
based on 5% to 10% 
fraud and error levels on 
£39.3 billion of payments. 
The 5% estimate equates 
to £2.0 billion
9.6 million total jobs furloughed with 1.2 million employers (61% of those 
eligible) making at least one CJRS claim1 
2 million estimate of workforce (to nearest million) remaining furloughed 
based on employers surveyed, 7 to 20 September 2020
9% proportion of furloughed employees in our survey telling us 
that they worked at their employer's request while furloughed 
2.6 million self-employed individuals made a fi rst grant claim to the SEISS 
scheme (77% of those potentially eligible) to 31 July 2020
99.5% CJRS claims paid within six working days
97.5% SEISS claims paid within six working days
£278 million amounts companies repaid voluntarily to HMRC for CJRS 
payments they did not need or took in error
£275 million overpayments HMRC estimates it could recover on 
10,000 CJRS payments it believes are at high-risk of fraud 
Note
1   The latest HMRC COVID-19 statistics are available at: www.gov.uk/government/collections/hmrc-
coronavirus-covid-19-statistics
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Summary
Introduction
1 On 20 March 2020 government announced the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme (CJRS), followed on 26 March by the Self-Employment Income Support 
Scheme (SEISS) as part of its economic response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Our report refers to these as ‘the schemes’. 
2 Initially government’s overriding ambition for both schemes was to provide 
financial support to businesses and individuals as quickly as possible in the wake 
of the COVID-19 pandemic to protect jobs. In summary:
• CJRS: The initial aim was to provide rapid financial support to help firms 
continue to keep people in employment. Employers could put workers on 
temporary leave and government would pay them cash grants of 80% 
of employees’ salaries, up to £2,500 a month (CJRS 1). From July and 
under a ‘flexible furlough’ phase (CJRS 2), the objectives changed to give 
firms flexibility to support the recovery and in August, by introducing an 
employer contribution.
• SEISS: The aim was to provide fast grant payments to self-employed 
individuals whose businesses had been ‘adversely affected’ by the pandemic. 
The grant was intended to help support self-employed individuals with 
living costs, but they could also continue to work, start a new trade or take 
up a new employment. A second SEISS grant was available to claim from 
17 August 2020.
3 The schemes were only open to existing taxpayers who met certain 
eligibility criteria. At 20 September 2020 CJRS had supported 1.2 million 
employers and 9.6 million jobs, with claims totalling £39.3 billion. The Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR) expects CJRS claims to reach £54.5 billion in total. 
By 20 September 2020 the SEISS scheme had at least 2.6 million claims, totalling 
£13.4 billion. OBR forecasts SEISS claims will total £15.2 billion, bringing total 
forecast spending for these schemes to nearly £70 billion. The CJRS scheme will 
end on 31 October. On 24 September 2020 government announced a new Job 
Support Scheme (JSS) intended to provide help for short-time working (reduced 
hours) and an extension to SEISS until April 2021. On 9 October government 
announced an extension to JSS (referred to as ‘expanded JSS’) to support 
companies whose businesses are legally required to close as a direct result of 
coronavirus restrictions.
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4 HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and HM Treasury – collectively referred 
to as ‘the Departments’ – were responsible for advising ministers on the design of 
the schemes. HM Treasury led on policy design and HMRC led on administrative 
design and then the implementation and administration of the schemes.
Scope of this report
5 The scale and nature of the current COVID-19 pandemic, and government’s 
response to it, is unprecedented in recent history. This report considers how 
well HM Treasury and HMRC have managed risks thus far in implementing these 
schemes. This report considers whether the Departments have:
• managed design and delivery risks effectively in implementing the 
schemes. Part One assesses the Departments’ implementation of these 
schemes against evaluative criteria that draw upon our work analysing 
the government’s response to other crises;
• understood whether the schemes are reaching the people intended. 
Part Two examines the Departments’ approach to ensuring that the 
schemes were reaching their intended recipients, whether they had a good 
understanding of the consequences of their design decisions and what the 
impact of those decisions has been; and
• managed fraud and error risks effectively. Part Three considers how far 
fraud and error risks have been addressed. 
6 This report does not consider HMRC’s other COVID-19 interventions 
designed to support businesses, including the Coronavirus Job Retention Bonus 
and Eat Out to Help Out, or the relationship between the schemes and wider 
government support such as business loans and benefits. We have previously 
reported on the Bounce Back Loans Scheme.1 
7 Our audit approach is described in Appendix One and the evidence base we 
used is in Appendix Two. Appendix Three provides international comparisons and 
Appendix Four shows how the schemes have evolved over time.
1 Comptroller and Auditor General, Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan scheme, Session 2019–2021, 
HC 860, National Audit Office, October 2020.
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Key findings
Designing and implementing the employment support schemes
8 The Departments implemented the schemes quickly and ahead of schedule. 
Ministers set clear objectives that both schemes should be delivered quickly. 
Government announced the CJRS scheme on 20 March 2020. HMRC planned 
to make initial CJRS payments by the end of April 2020, but made it available 
to employers from 20 April, just a month after the government’s announcement.
Government announced the SEISS scheme on 26 March. HMRC intended to 
make SEISS payments by the beginning of June but made the scheme available 
from 13 May, two weeks early. HMRC accelerated the original timetable for the 
SEISS scheme, recognising the need to provide financial support to eligible 
customers as quickly as possible (paragraphs 1.1 to 1.4 and Figure 2).
9 The scale of the challenge was potentially increased by the lack of 
pandemic contingency planning and existing employment support schemes 
the Departments could easily adapt. Instead, HM Treasury told us it drew on 
economic contingency planning designed for financial rescues, developed 
following the credit crisis; and draft policy work on wage subsidy schemes 
and lessons learned from other countries, such as Germany, in implementing 
short-time working schemes (paragraph 1.7).
10 Given the compressed timeframe to design each scheme, the Departments 
could not follow standard processes comprehensively. In the circumstances, the 
Departments had insufficient time to produce detailed documentation – such as 
business cases, options appraisal and detailed cost-benefit analysis – that we would 
normally expect to be available to support key investment decisions. Instead, policy 
and operational officials worked closely together to rapidly develop employment 
support schemes that they could implement quickly. HMRC agreed clear principles 
for both schemes, including that the claim process should be simple and the grant 
calculation straightforward. HMRC used existing supplier relationships and contracts 
to develop the IT solution (paragraphs 1.5 to 1.6, 1.8, 1.9).
11 HMRC implemented the schemes quickly through strong project 
management, risk management and service testing. Detailed planning and project 
management were central to rapid delivery. The Departments took a structured 
approach to identify and manage risk, using government’s Orange Book on risk 
management. HMRC’s IT staff took four weeks to implement the CJRS scheme, 
compared with an average of around 18 months that they normally need to deliver 
major IT projects. HMRC tested customer journeys and developed guidance for 
customers and training for staff to enable the effective operation of the schemes 
(paragraphs 1.10 to 1.18 and Figure 3).
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12 Other countries, at the start of the pandemic, were able to adapt existing 
schemes to deliver support more quickly. We contacted 20 national audit 
institutions to understand how their respective governments designed and 
implemented similar employment support schemes. Most countries implemented 
their schemes faster than CJRS, but almost all had pre-existing arrangements 
they could adapt. Countries such as Germany and France already had short-time 
work schemes in place to support companies with salary costs at times of 
economic crisis (paragraphs 1.19 to 1.23 and Figure 4).
Supporting the people intended
13 The schemes have been largely successful in protecting jobs through the 
lockdown period, with at least 12.2 million people benefitting from support. 
The CJRS scheme supported 9.6 million jobs and, at its peak in May, around 
30% of the workforce eligible for the scheme across the UK were furloughed. 
The SEISS scheme supported at least 2.6 million self-employed people, around 
77% of the 3.4 million people potentially eligible for the scheme. The number of 
jobs furloughed fell to around five million by the end of July, while unemployment 
levels remained broadly stable at around 4% of the workforce. This suggests 
the schemes provided an effective bridge during the early phases of the 
pandemic, allowing some people to return to work when the national lockdown 
eased. However, the number of people on payrolls fell by 0.5 million between 
March and April. We found one in five people we surveyed who were in paid 
employment were not furloughed but had their pay or hours reduced, presumably 
because they could continue to work in some capacity through lockdown without 
their employer drawing on CJRS (paragraphs 2.12 to 2.16, Figure 7 and Figure 9).
14 A combination of policy decisions and constraints in the tax system 
meant that as many as 2.9 million people were not eligible for the schemes. 
People were excluded from the schemes either because of ministerial decisions 
about how to target the schemes, or because HMRC did not have data needed 
to properly guard against the risk of fraud. The precise number of people needing 
help is uncertain because not everyone will have been sufficiently affected by the 
pandemic to need financial support. Groups ineligible for support were as follows: 
• CJRS: an estimated 1.1 million people were ineligible because HMRC had 
limited data to verify claims. HMRC has not estimated the number affected 
but third-party estimates suggest around 0.4 million short-term contractors 
moving between jobs were ineligible. Additionally, 0.7 million limited company 
directors could not claim for company dividends paid instead of salaries. 
The tax system treats company dividends as investment income and 
HMRC cannot separately identify those payments from other investments. 
However, company directors could still claim for earnings registered with 
the Pay-As-You-Earn scheme and apply for bounce back loans. 
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• SEISS: HMRC estimated that around 1.6 million self-employed people did not 
meet the scheme’s policy criteria. Of these, 1.4 million people had trading 
profit that was less than their non-trading income; 0.5 million people had 
a trading profit of £0 or made a loss; and 0.2 million people were ineligible 
because their trading profits exceeded £50,000.2 
• SEISS: third-parties estimated a further 0.2 million people who were newly 
self-employed in 2019-20 were ineligible because they had not yet submitted 
a Self Assessment return. Therefore, HMRC did not have verified records on 
which to confirm their activity and estimate their income. This figure could 
have been greater had lockdown occurred further from the January 2020 
deadline for annual tax Self Assessment returns. HMRC intends to introduce 
more frequent (quarterly) reporting for self-employed people under Making 
Tax Digital from April 2023 (paragraphs 2.6 to 2.11 and Figure 6).
15 The Departments considered the equality implications of their design 
decisions. The Departments carried out equality impact assessments for both 
schemes. They identified that a high proportion of Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic people were self-employed and undertook additional work to raise 
awareness of SEISS with stakeholder groups. HMRC’s monitoring data provide 
information on the age and gender profiles of people covered by the schemes but 
do not report on other protected characteristics, such as ethnicity, as these data 
are not necessary for the administration of taxes. The data show that a greater 
proportion of younger workers were furloughed. A greater proportion of men were 
furloughed initially, but this reduced over time and by September there was little 
difference between men and women. In August 2020 HMRC began tendering 
for survey and qualitative research to gain additional feedback on the schemes 
(paragraphs 2.17 to 2.22 and Figure 10).
16 In the long-term the number of jobs protected will depend on wider 
government support. Around two million (9%) workers remained furloughed in 
mid-September. Retail, accommodation and food services, manufacturing and 
construction have claimed the most financial support from the schemes to date. 
Many of these sectors have also utilised bounce back loans. The long-term 
impact of the schemes is likely to be difficult to disentangle from the effects of 
wider government support and the ongoing impact of COVID-19. The new JSS is 
intended to support short-time working between November 2020 and April 2021. 
Government has also announced an extension to SEISS over the period and 
further furlough support (expanded JSS) for businesses legally required to close 
due to lockdown restrictions (paragraphs 2.23 to 2.28 and Figure 11).
2  Some individuals fell into more than one category, meaning numbers add to more than 1.6 million.
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Managing fraud and error
17 In implementing the schemes, the Departments accepted there may be a 
higher risk of fraud and error than normal, in order to provide rapid financial support 
and protect jobs. Recognising the priority placed on speed, the Departments have 
tolerated greater risk than normal. Limiting the schemes only to taxpayers with 
current records has helped to reduce the risk of certain types of fraud significantly 
because applicants had to be known to HMRC and had to be paying tax. However, 
the aim to make payments within six working days limited HMRC’s ability to carry 
out pre-payment checks. For example, HMRC did not validate some data upfront 
or require details of the amounts claimed for every employee before making 
payments. It made a systematic assessment of the risks and prospects of recovery 
from different groups and prioritised its response for the time constraints it faced. 
HMRC did not have the enforcement powers to recover overpayments by the time 
the schemes went live. It took a calculated risk that powers would be granted and 
received these in July 2020 (paragraphs 3.5 to 3.9 and Figure 15).
18 There is evidence that significant levels of furlough fraud occurred, with 
limited controls over employers’ arrangements with employees. Employers 
committed furlough fraud if they claimed furlough payments but kept employees 
working for them against CJRS rules. HMRC’s fraud hotline has received more 
than 10,000 reports, mainly of furlough fraud, but it has not yet carried out survey 
work or random sampling to estimate the scale of the issue. Of furloughed people 
responding to our survey, 9% admitted to working in lockdown at the request 
of their employer, and against the rules of the scheme. Other surveys indicate 
between 7% and 34% of furloughed employees surveyed worked at the request 
of their employer while furloughed. HMRC concluded it would tackle fraud through 
whistleblowing and retrospective compliance work. However, employees would not 
have known if their employer was part of the government furlough scheme unless 
their employer had informed them. Controls such as contacting employees directly 
or publicising which companies claimed furlough payments were considered but 
rejected. HMRC concluded it would have been unrealistic to contact employees 
because of the large numbers involved, and that publishing a list of employers 
risked deterring too many legitimate claims. HMRC intends to publish the names 
of employers claiming the JSS scheme and to notify employees through their 
personal tax accounts when an employer has claimed JSS (paragraphs 3.10 
to 3.21 and Figure 18).
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19 The scale of total fraud and error is likely to be considerable, particularly for 
CJRS, but HMRC will not know the actual levels for some time. HMRC’s planning 
assumption was that total fraud and error could range from 5% to 10% on CJRS, 
which would equate to £2.0 billion to £3.9 billion based on payments made by 
mid-September. For the first SEISS grant, HMRC’s planning assumption was that 
fraud and error could range from 1% to 2%. Both these estimates were largely 
assumption-based rather than evidence-based. At the end of September 2020, 
HMRC was developing a programme of work to understand the full scale of fraud 
and error. It aims to refine its provisional estimates again by the end of 2020 and in 
spring 2021 as it undertakes more compliance work and receives more operational 
intelligence. HMRC does not expect to have a complete assessment of the total 
fraud and error it needs to tackle until the end of 2021 at the earliest. HMRC is 
monitoring the levels of organised criminal activity including the stealing of taxpayer 
identities and coercion of taxpayers to make fraudulent claims. To date, HMRC has 
blocked only £10 million of CJRS claims. It intends to measure its effectiveness in 
mitigating the risk in due course (paragraphs 3.20 to 3.28 and Figure 16).
20 HMRC’s initial assessment was that it must divert resources from tax 
compliance activities to tackle fraud on these schemes. HMRC estimates it could 
deploy around 500 staff to recover £275 million on 10,000 of the most high-risk 
CJRS grants awarded. While this offers a high rate of return, HMRC estimates 
that redeploying staff will come at a cost to tax revenue because HMRC’s 
tax compliance work offers even higher rates of return. In June 2020 HMRC 
concluded that its only option to address grant fraud and error was to redeploy 
existing, trained staff. It concluded it could not bring in additional staff because 
they would take up to 18 months to recruit and train to undertake complex 
compliance work, and this would be too long. In October 2020 HMRC told us 
that with the announcement of new schemes, and better understanding from the 
operation of SEISS and CJRS, it was now planning to use private contractors to 
supplement its compliance capacity where necessary. HMRC does not yet know 
the scale of fraud and error it needs to tackle to any degree of certainty, and it is 
not yet clear for how long its compliance activity will be affected by the COVID-19 
pandemic (paragraphs 3.29 to 3.31 and Figure 19).
Conclusion on value for money
21 HM Treasury and HMRC met their objective to rapidly implement the 
schemes and the Departments should be commended for making these available 
ahead of schedule. The schemes were relatively straightforward to apply for, and 
payments quickly reached those who applied. Indications are that this has helped 
to protect jobs in the short term and the numbers of people moving from furlough 
arrangements back to work are encouraging. However, many other people have 
lost earnings and have not been able to access support. The long-term impact 
of the schemes will also depend on wider financial support and the ongoing 
impact of COVID-19.
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22 A key value-for-money test for these schemes will be how far the 
Departments can mitigate fraud and error. The pace at which the schemes 
were designed and implemented meant the Departments had to accept a greater 
risk than normal. As such, there are likely to be considerable amounts of fraud 
and error, particularly on the furlough scheme. Limiting applications to existing 
taxpayers should have reduced the fraud risk, but HMRC could have done more to 
make clear to employees whether their employer was part of the furlough scheme. 
In future, the Departments should do more while employment support schemes 
are running to protect employees and counter acts of fraud. The Departments will 
need to ensure sufficient resources are committed to recover money where it is 
cost-effective to do so.
Recommendations
23 To learn from their experience in implementing the employment support 
schemes, and to protect taxpayer interests HM Treasury and HMRC should: 
a consider how to ensure that reliable data covering as many people as 
possible can be used to determine eligibility so that fewer people suffering 
loss of income are excluded from future similar schemes;
b monitor how far employment support schemes protect jobs, recognising that 
the approach may need to adapt rapidly in response to how the pandemic 
evolves over the coming months; 
c increase the emphasis on using preventative controls for tackling fraud and 
error in the new schemes. Where appropriate for future schemes, carry out 
more direct work with employees to ensure employers treat them according 
to scheme rules, and increase visibility of which employers use employment 
support schemes;
d more quickly assess the total value of error and fraud; and explore the 
feasibility of commencing assessment activity earlier for future schemes so 
that some testing is undertaken while schemes are live; 
e review whether a faster programme of recruitment and training can be 
provided for grant compliance staff, recognising that the activity may differ 
to tax compliance work; and
f review how to organise HMRC’s compliance response to ensure that 
sufficient resources are committed to recover overpayments and fraudulent 
payments on both schemes where it is cost-effective to do so. 
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24 As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, leading to ongoing uncertainty, 
the Departments may need to develop longer-term plans to support businesses 
and jobs which will involve balancing speed of response with risks to value for 
money. This includes targeting support to those who need it, treating employees 
in accordance with the scheme rules, and reducing fraud and error. In balancing 
these, the Departments should:
g ensure that their consideration of options, including under the JSS and 
extended schemes, are sufficiently well-documented to demonstrate how 
risks to value for money have been considered and resultant risks are clearly 
understood and managed; 
h specify how performance and value for money will be judged as the 
schemes progress, monitoring outcomes and adapting arrangements quickly 
if required; and
i consider how HMRC should organise its systems and capabilities to provide 
this targeted support, which may require different choices in digitising the 
tax system, more frequent filing of tax return data, better linking of customer 
records, and changes to customer services.
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Part One
HM Revenue & Customs’ implementation of the 
employment support schemes
1.1 In late March 2020 the government announced two UK-wide employment 
support schemes in response to the coronavirus crisis. The schemes, 
administered by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) following HM Treasury’s 
direction, were:
• The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS): to provide grant 
payments to employers to help firms continue to keep people in employment. 
Employers could put workers on temporary leave and the government would 
pay them cash grants of 80% of employees’ salaries, up to £2,500 a month. 
Phase 1 (CJRS 1) of the scheme operated to the end of June 2020. From 
July to October 2020 a modified, second phase (CJRS 2) allowed employers 
to bring employees back to work part-time. 
• The Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS): to provide a 
grant payment to self-employed individuals whose business has been 
‘adversely affected’ by the pandemic. The grant was intended to help 
support self-employed individuals with living costs, and they could continue 
to work, start a new trade or take up a new employment. A second SEISS 
grant was available to claim from 17 August 2020.
1.2 The schemes are part of a wider government response targeting businesses 
and individuals (Figure 1).3
3 Our May 2020 report on government’s response to COVID-19 gives a fuller description of its crisis response. 
See Comptroller and Auditor General, Overview of the UK government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
Session 2019-21, HC 366, National Audit Office, May 2020.
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The schemes are part of a wider portfolio of government support
Wider context of government support for businesses and individuals 
Notes
1 For information on the government’s initial response to the Coronavirus pandemic, see Comptroller and Auditor General, Overview of the UK 
government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Session 2019-21, HC 366, National Audit Offi ce, May 2020.
2 CJRS 2 is also referred to as the Flexible Furlough scheme.
3 On 24 September 2020, the Government announced that it was creating the Job Support Scheme to replace the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme and was extending the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme. Further information on these developments can be found at:
www.gov.uk/government/publications/winter-economy-plan/winter-economy-plan
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HMRC and other government departments’ information
The schemes provided grant support for businesses and for individuals during the pandemic
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme
Phase One (CJRS 1) March to June 2020
Employers received grant payments for their furloughed 
employees up to 80% of their salary, capped at £2,500 
per month. Employer can top up voluntarily.
Phase Two (CJRS 2) July to October 2020
Employers were expected to contribute an increasing 
proportion of costs:
• July and August 2020: 80% of salary, capped 
at £2,500 per month. From August, employer 
pays employers National Insurance and 
pension contributions.
• September 2020: 70% of salary, capped at £2,187.50 
per month. Employer tops up to at least 80%.
• October 2020: 60% of salary, capped at £1,875 per 
month. Employer tops up to at least 80%.
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme
Two grants paid between April and October 2020 to 
eligible self-employed people who had:
• traded in the 2018-19 tax year;
• trading profits up to £50,000;
• at least half of their income from trading sources; and
• continued to trade in 2019-20 and expected to 
continue in 2020-21.
First grant was for 80% of three months of an individual’s 
trading profits capped at £7,500.
Second grant was for 70% of three months of an 
individual’s trading profits capped at £6,570.
Support for businesses
Loans and liquidity.
Grants and other funding support.
Additional reliefs.
Support for retaining jobs –
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS).
Support for individuals
Benefits and sick pay.
Direct support to individuals and households.
Deferring tax payments.
Support for self-employed people –
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS).
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The Departments implemented the schemes quickly and ahead of 
their schedule
1.3 Ministers asked HM Treasury and HMRC to develop schemes to protect 
jobs and for these to be operational very quickly. The Departments were set clear 
targets for each scheme:
• CJRS: to build and launch a claims service before the end of April 2020, 
with claims being processed and paid within six working days.
• SEISS: to build and launch a claims service by the beginning of June 2020, 
with at least 80% anticipated to claim, and claims processed and paid 
within six working days.
1.4 The Departments implemented both schemes ahead of schedule, with CJRS 
available to employers from 20 April and SEISS to the self-employed from 13 May. 
HMRC accelerated the original timetable for the SEISS scheme by almost two 
weeks, recognising the need to provide financial support to eligible taxpayers 
as quickly as possible. The two new digital services could be accessed from the 
GOV.UK website.
Developing the strategic response
1.5 Initial strategy work focused on CJRS. HMRC and HM Treasury officials 
worked collaboratively to develop the response under lockdown conditions, 
engaging regularly with senior ministers. Policy and operational staff in both 
Departments worked closely to ensure that policy choices were feasible, seeking 
to balance the need to implement support for people quickly with the need to 
guard against fraud. 
1.6 HMRC agreed clear design principles for the schemes including that the 
claim process should be simple, that the data used to determine eligibility should 
be easy to obtain and the grant calculation straightforward. The Departments 
recommended that only people and businesses with an existing taxpayer record 
could apply for support to reduce the risk of fraud.
1.7 The Departments had little contingency planning for a pandemic and 
limited experience of designing schemes of this type and scale. Contingency 
planning for pandemics had focused on the public health response and not 
on the economic response. HM Treasury told us it drew instead on economic 
contingency planning for financial rescues, draft policy work on wage subsidy 
schemes and short-time working schemes, and lessons learned material provided 
by German counterparts.
Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic Part One 17 
Devising robust plans and governance
1.8 Given the compressed timeframe to design each scheme, the Departments 
could not follow standard processes comprehensively. In the circumstances, 
the Departments had insufficient time to produce the detailed documentation 
– such as business cases, options appraisal and detailed cost-benefit 
analysis – that we would normally expect to be available to support key 
investment decisions.4 HMRC’s Accounting Officer accepted the Department’s 
responsibility for delivering CJRS grants following verbal advice on the legality, 
propriety, deliverability and value for money of the scheme from his officials on 
20 March 2020, just prior to the Chancellor’s announcement of the scheme. 
However, due to time constraints, HMRC’s Accounting Officer did not receive 
formal written advice on the legality, propriety, deliverability and value for money 
of the scheme until after the Chancellor’s announcement.
1.9 HMRC moved quickly to put effective governance arrangements in place, with 
core project teams set up to work on both schemes. It used its experience from 
EU Exit work and the Statutory Sick Pay Rebate scheme to inform its approach. 
HMRC deployed staff familiar with EU exit governance arrangements, with high 
levels of engagement from senior staff. HMRC appointed a senior responsible 
officer at director-general level and created a dedicated director-led COVID-19 
response unit. There was a clear escalation route to HMRC’s senior management 
with its Accounting Officer involved in decision-making. HM Treasury officials 
worked with HMRC programme leads and attended meetings. HMRC’s Internal 
Audit function which provided support and assurance to the schemes noted no 
significant issues with the Departments’ governance approach.  
Implementing the schemes
1.10 HMRC implemented a structured approach to managing and recording 
project progress, risks, issues and decision-making for the schemes, making 
use of the government’s Orange Book on risk management best practice. 
HMRC also consulted with other government departments familiar with good 
practice in administering grant programmes. 
1.11 In challenging circumstances, HM Treasury and HMRC staff worked long 
hours, at weekends and through the Easter period to develop the schemes. 
HMRC made use of its existing supplier contract to build the digital systems 
for the schemes. The demands on the Departments’ core project teams were 
considerable with its IT project team reporting it completed the work in just 
four weeks. HMRC’s IT staff told us major IT projects normally take 18 months 
to 21 months to deliver, while small projects normally take between 8 months 
and 13 months.
4 See HM Treasury, Guide to Developing the Business Case, 2018 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/749086/Project_Business_Case_2018.pdf
18 Part One Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
1.12 HMRC developed comprehensive customer journey mapping which it tested 
internally and with tax agents and developed guidance for customers and staff, 
providing additional online training.
1.13 HMRC identified that developing the schemes at pace had caused some 
difficulties. For example:
• Record-keeping of key documents such as process maps was not always 
controlled and internal reviewers found gaps in the logging of project risks, 
although HMRC told us these omissions were minor.
• Guidance to front-line staff was sometimes issued with little notice due to 
the delivery timescales and HMRC identified issues with staff compliance 
with the guidance. Changes to guidance were not always communicated 
clearly, meaning staff used it inconsistently, which increased the risk of 
fraud and miscommunication. Some staff failed to take customers through 
security processes or read out key statements to customers.
• The planned model for processing claims did not work as anticipated at first. 
HMRC planned a three-tiered approach in which certain staff would process 
simple claims, with more experienced staff at a second and third tier dealing 
with more complicated or higher risk claims. Roles and responsibilities 
for each tier were unclear, resulting in customer calls being unnecessarily 
escalated and placing pressure on upper tiers. At one point, 80% of SEISS 
calls were handed to a higher tier. HMRC believes that earlier involvement 
of front-line operations teams in the work of the project development teams 
would have improved implementation. It revised its three-tier model from 
June 2020 and told us that it became more efficient. HMRC has also since 
taken steps to clarify advisor roles and responsibilities.
Measuring and evaluating performance
1.14 HMRC developed performance dashboards for reporting CJRS and SEISS 
progress to support management decision-making, and it published statistics 
on the take-up of schemes. Dashboards were reported regularly to HMRC’s 
executive management with information on scheme take-up, claim values, 
project risks and ‘risk profiling’ of fraudulent claims. 
1.15 HMRC achieved most of its early ‘ambition criteria’ for the schemes 
(Figure 2). The vast majority of payments were processed within target 
timeframes, meeting the key objective to get financial support to claimants 
quickly. HMRC was able to maintain processing performance and meet payment 
targets despite, in the week of 11 May 2020, receiving over 2.5 million claims for 
support under the two schemes. 
Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic Part One 19 
Figure 2
HMRC performance against its early performance criteria
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) achieved most of its early performance criteria
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS)
Criteria Performance
Build, test and launch a claims service by 
20 April 2020.
CJRS launched on 20 April 2020.
Make vast majority of payments within six 
working days, ensuring a risking window of 
no more than 72 hours.1
99.5% of claims were processed within three 
working days.3
Deliver payments by 30 April 2020 for those 
who claimed by 23 April 2020.
99.8% of claims were paid.
Enable access for agents.2 Agents able to apply for CJRS on behalf 
of employers.
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS)
Criteria Performance
Build and launch a claims service by 
early June.
SEISS was launched on 13 May, well ahead 
of schedule. 
80% take-up from eligible customers. 77% claimed under SEISS 1 by 31 July.
Customers paid within six working days. 97.5% of SEISS payments were made within 
six working days.3 
Notes
1 A ‘risking window’ is the period allowed for HMRC to assess the risk of fraud attached to a claim and decide 
whether to investigate the claim further. 
2 HMRC permits agents to manage tax affairs on behalf of an individual or employer. An agent can be a 
professional accountant or tax adviser, a friend or relative, or someone from a voluntary organisation. 
3 Payments made by bank transfer (BACS) have a 72-hour processing window which meant that most claimants 
would have received their payment up to six working days from application.
4 Performance data is for the period from scheme launch to August 2020.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs information
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1.16 HMRC carried out surveys of employers, employees and self-employed 
people to understand levels of scheme awareness and understanding, and 
customer experience. Most (94%) respondents to HMRC’s survey of just over 
2,000 employers who had applied to the scheme said they were very or fairly 
satisfied with the time taken to receive their money and only 1% described their 
experience of applying for CJRS funds as very poor. HMRC’s weekly customer 
satisfaction data for SEISS up to August 2020 found that 95% of claimants 
were satisfied or very satisfied with their experience, with only 2% being 
very dissatisfied.
Lessons learned
1.17 HMRC undertook lessons learned exercises for both schemes in late spring 
and used findings to inform its ongoing delivery. Figure 3 uses our own analysis 
of learning from previous crisis responses to assess the Departments’ approach 
to designing and implementing these schemes. We saw particular strengths in the 
following areas:
• close working between policy development and operational experts, enabling 
better understanding of design parameters and inclusion of operational 
aspects of policy in plans from the outset;
• clear governance structures, drawing on proven models;
• detailed control frameworks, used to assess and prioritise controls through 
the design and implementation of the schemes (albeit with some gaps);
• detailed project management plans, which had milestones specified to the 
hour at critical points; and
• early mapping of customer journeys and testing of the approach through 
process walkthroughs and beta-testing with customers.
1.18 HMRC is commissioning further research on its delivery of the 
schemes and expects to use these results to inform its design of future services. 
The Departments have not said whether they will commission an economic 
evaluation of the additional impact of the schemes. HM Treasury told us that it 
is conducting its own lessons learned exercises to identify how such employment 
support schemes could be delivered at speed in the future.
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Figure 3
Assessing the Departments’ implementation of the schemes using our core 
management cycle, adapted for a crisis scenario
The Departments achieved a lot in a short time, but lessons can still be learnt
Stage Factors indicating an effective response in a crisis2 NAO assessment
Strategy Contingency plans in place before crisis. 
Clear objectives and success criteria. 
Use evidence and work with others. 
Develop exit strategy early. 
Planning and governance Assure business plans where possible.  
Establish clear ownership and governance.  
Promote stability in, and manage demands on, 
the core response team.

Clear and consistent communications.  
Implementation Robust project management.  
Effective controls and risk management, 
document decisions.

Robust guidance for frontline staff and resources 
deployed responsively.

Measurement Appropriate indicators of performance. 
Collect data, improve arrangements over time and 
use several sources. 

Use data continuously in a crisis.   
Evaluation and feedback Evaluate during and after the crisis, identify 
lessons learnt and use these to modify crisis 
intervention and planning for next time.

Notes
1 Our classifi cation of the Departments’ performance uses a three-point scale: Two ticks = good evidence, 
one tick = partial evidence. A cross indicates that we have not seen clear evidence or have seen evidence 
of poor performance in relation to the evaluative criteria.
2 We have used the NAO’s core management cycle to organise our evaluative criteria drawing from our past 
reviews of government responses to humanitarian and fi nancial crises. The management cycle sets out the 
main stages that departments should consider in designing and implementing programmes and highlights 
the importance of using evaluation and feedback.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs information
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Most other countries had existing employment support schemes, 
and were able to implement support more quickly
1.19 The Departments looked at the experience in other countries to inform the 
design of the schemes. The experience of other countries can also be used to 
assess how the schemes could have been implemented more quickly, and the 
types of support arrangements that enable a more rapid response.
1.20 In developing CJRS, the Departments referred to responses in other 
countries in their discussions with ministers. They looked at several schemes 
including Germany’s short-time work scheme, schemes in France, Canada, 
Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand and Ireland but noted their direct application 
to the UK might be limited given the different labour market and welfare contexts.
1.21 Many countries including Germany and France already had short-time 
work schemes in place that could be built on in response to the pandemic. 
These schemes allowed firms to temporarily furlough or reduce the hours of staff 
at times of economic difficulty, with governments providing income support for 
employees when not working. Based on correspondence with 20 international 
audit institutions and other supporting evidence, we looked at how quickly a 
sample of nine OECD countries with economies of comparable size to the UK 
had implemented their job retention schemes (Figure 4). We found that other 
countries implemented employment support schemes more quickly, but most 
of these already had an existing scheme in place. Eight of the nine had schemes 
they could adapt, while six reported setting up new schemes.
1.22 Our analysis suggested that the UK had relatively few eligibility criteria 
for CJRS compared with other countries. Most countries required employers to 
demonstrate a specified fall in turnover, and many required employers to top-up 
wages or prohibited redundancies while the scheme was active. The Netherlands 
prohibited executive bonuses, payment of dividends and repurchase of 
own shares. The UK CJRS scheme did not make any such requirements of 
employers (Appendix Three).
1.23 On 24 September 2020 the Chancellor announced a Winter Economy Plan 
which included a six-month Jobs Support Scheme (JSS), starting in November, to 
replace the CJRS scheme. The JSS scheme aims to provide help for short-time 
working to support ‘viable jobs’. To qualify, employees must be working at least 
one-third of their usual hours. The government will pay one-third of hours not 
worked up to a cap, with the employer also contributing one-third. This will mean 
employees earn a minimum of 77% of their normal wages, where the government 
contribution has not been capped. The level of grant will be calculated based 
on employee’s contracted salary, capped at £697.92 per month. The JSS will 
be open to businesses across the UK even if they have not previously used the 
furlough scheme. 
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1.24 On 9 October 2020, the government announced an expansion to the 
JSS to provide extra support to businesses legally required to close as a direct 
result of coronavirus restrictions set by one or more of the governments in 
the UK. Expanded JSS is broadly akin to the original CJRS with employers 
expected to fully furlough employees. Employers are not required to contribute 
to their employees’ wages apart from national insurance and minimum pension 
contributions, where applicable. The government will pay up to two-thirds of 
employee wages, capped at £2,100 per month.
1.25 In September, the government also announced that it would provide a further 
taxable grant to self-employed people currently eligible for SEISS who continue 
to actively trade and face reduced demand due to coronavirus. The initial lump 
sum will cover three months’ worth of profits for the period from November to the 
end of January 2021. The grant is worth 20% of average monthly profits, up to a 
total of £1,875. An additional second grant, which may be adjusted to respond to 
changing circumstances, will be available for self-employed individuals to cover 
the period from February 2021 to the end of April 2021. Appendix Four sets out 
the different levels of support for these schemes. 
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Part Two
Beneficiaries of the employment support schemes
2.1 This part considers how far the employment support schemes have 
supported businesses and people. It examines:
• how the schemes aimed to support business and individual taxpayers;
• why some existing taxpayers were ineligible for the schemes;
• the cost and impact of the schemes thus far;
• the extent to which the schemes have supported different demographic 
groups, regions and sectors; and 
• the number remaining furloughed as the current schemes wind-down.
How the schemes aimed to support business and individual taxpayers
2.2 On 20 March, the Chancellor announced a package of economic 
support aimed at protecting jobs through the lockdown period, including the 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS). This was followed on 26 March by 
his announcement of the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS). 
The broad aim of the employment support schemes was to provide security for 
employers to retain employees and to protect the self-employed so that there 
would not be a large spike in unemployment and to give the UK the best chance 
of a rapid economic recovery. 
2.3 Figure 5 overleaf summarises the scope of the schemes. For the first phase 
of CJRS (CJRS 1), furloughed employees were not allowed to work, to avoid 
government supporting those employers not adversely affected by COVID-19. 
For CJRS 2, from July 2020, these aims shifted to allow furloughed workers 
back on a part-time basis, encouraging firms to increase production and, where 
necessary, make redundancies if jobs had become unsustainable. Employers not 
already in the CJRS 1 scheme were not allowed to claim CJRS grants during this 
second phase.
26 Part Two Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Figure 5
Policy objectives for CJRS and SEISS and their key eligibility criteria
Notes
1 Example eligibility criteria shown only. Other eligibility rules apply for both schemes.
2 Taxpayers previously subject to the loan charge arrangement and who had been granted until 30 September to submit their
2018-19 tax return were allowed to apply for SEISS. Also see Gov.uk, Update on the implementation of the loan charge, August 2020 at:
www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-the-implementation-of-the-loan-charge
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ and other government departmental information
Eligibility rules vary across the HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) schemes
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS)
Extensions 
to eligibility Employee must have been furloughed under CJRS 1 to be 
furloughed under CJRS 2 from 1 July 2020.
Deadline extended for employees to be registered on HMRC 
records from 28 February to 19 March 2020.
Parents returning to work after extended leave and military 
reservists returning to their employment after 10 June 2020 
(usual deadline for CJRS 1) allowed to be furloughed for first 
time under CJRS 2.
Can claim the second SEISS grant even if did not claim 
the first.
Parents whose trading profits were affected in 2018-19 
following recent birth or adoption.
Military reservists carrying out reservist activities for at 
least 90 days in 2018-19 tax year.
Individuals subject to the loan charge arrangement.









CJRS 1: Provide rapid financial support to help firms 
continue to keep people in employment.  
CJRS 2: Give firms flexibility to support the recovery and 
from August, introduce an employer contribution. 
Target private sector employers.
Income support for self-employed people adversely 
affected by the pandemic.
19 March 2020 
Real Time Information employer return including 
furloughed employees.
23 April 2020 
Extended deadline for 2018-19 Self Assessment tax 
return. Original deadline was 31 January 2020.
CJRS 1 to 30 June 2020: Furloughed employees should 
not work.
CJRS 2 from 1 July 2020: Furloughed employees can work 
for any amount of time or shift pattern, with employers 
claiming CJRS grant for employee hours not worked.
Employers only claim under CJRS 2 if there was a valid 
claim under CJRS 1.
Self-employed people can continue to work and claim a 
SEISS grant as long as their trade is adversely affected.
Trading profits of up to £50,000 and maximum 
grant capped.
No limit on employee earnings but maximum employer 
grant is capped.
Employee can receive multiple support across 
several employments.
Trading profits only – excludes other income from 
earnings, property, dividends, savings, pension etc.
Trading profits at least 50% of non-trading income.
Discretionary elements of pay such as tips, bonuses 
and commission.
Non-monetary benefits like benefits in kind or benefits 
received under salary sacrifice schemes that reduce 
taxable pay.
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2.4 The SEISS scheme was open to the self-employed and members of a 
partnership who claimed to have been ‘adversely affected’ by coronavirus and:
• had submitted their Self Assessment tax return on or before 
31 January 2020 for the 2018-19 tax year;5 
• continued to trade in 2019-20; and
• intended to trade in 2020-21.
2.5 Those claiming the second grant had to confirm that their business had 
been adversely affected on or after 14 July 2020. Unlike the first phase of CJRS, 
SEISS recipients were allowed to continue working. 
A combination of constraints in the tax system and policy decisions 
restricted eligibility for the schemes 
2.6 Combined, the employment support schemes had supported at least 
12.2 million jobs by 20 September 2020. HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) data 
show that 1.2 million employers – 61% of those eligible – claimed a grant under 
CJRS. By 20 September 2020, CJRS had supported 9.6 million jobs. Of 3.4 million 
people potentially eligible for the SEISS scheme, 2.6 million (77%) claimed the 
first grant and 2.2 million had applied for the second grant by 20 September on the 
basis that the pandemic adversely affected their self-employed incomes. 
2.7 HMRC has estimated that 1.6 million people were ineligible for SEISS 
because of the decisions ministers took to restrict support to people whose 
main income came from self-employment and who earned up to £50,000.6 
However, other groups of people were rendered ineligible for support because 
the way the tax system has been set up limited the data HMRC could use to help 
it guard against fraud (Figure 6 overleaf). Third-party estimates suggest a further 
1.3 million people were excluded, although some may not have been adversely 
affected by the pandemic. 
2.8 To manage the risk of fraud, access to both schemes was restricted to 
taxpayers with current tax records, which meant that people who were between 
jobs or had recently become self-employed were not eligible. HMRC extended the 
cut-off date for CJRS to people being on an employer’s payroll from 28 February 
to 19 March 2020 – the day before the details of the scheme were publicly 
announced. HMRC estimates this benefitted at least 0.2 million extra employees. 
5 A self-employed person or partnership could be adversely affected by coronavirus for a variety of reasons such 
as illness or suspended trading, but no minimum level was specified. HMRC later extended the Self Assessment 
tax return deadline to 23 April 2020 – see paragraph 2.9.
6 £50,000 is the Higher rate income tax threshold and the threshold at which Child Benefit tapers take effect.
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Figure 6
Groups excluded from the schemes
Significant numbers of people were potentially not able to access the schemes, many because of tax system constraints






(less than 50% income from self-employment)
0.5 million
(self-employment was loss making)
0.2 million
(income more than £50,000)
0.2 million
(newly self-employed)





(limited company directors paid 
by dividend)
0.4 million
(short-term or freelancer workers 
missing payroll)
1.1 million 1.1  million
Total 1.6 million 1.3 million 2.9 million
Notes
1 Policy decisions are those taken by the Departments to meet scheme objectives, including to target those people most likely to have 
been adversely affected by the pandemic. For example, for SEISS the decision that eligible people should earn 50% or more of 
their income from self-employment.
2 The principle that HMRC should use existing data on taxpayers for administrative ease and to help manage fraud risk also meant 
that some people were not eligible for support because HMRC did not hold suffi cient tax records to support a claim.
3 For SEISS: The 1.6 million customers ineligible for SEISS on policy grounds is an HMRC estimate. A self-employed person could have multiple 
reasons for not being eligible for SEISS and could be in more than one of the three categories identifi ed by HMRC. The 0.2 million newly 
self-employed ineligible is based on Offi ce for National Statistics (ONS) data on the number of individuals becoming self-employed in 2019-20.
4 For CJRS: The 0.7 million limited company directors is an estimate provided in evidence to the June 2020 Treasury Select Committee and 
incorporated into its report. However, company directors could still claim for Pay-As-You-Earn registered earnings and apply for bounce back loans. 
Meanwhile, in its June 2020 report the Treasury Select Committee estimated the population of short-term or freelancer workers to be 0.8 million. 
ExcludedUK estimated 0.4 million of these were excluded.
5 A proportion of the groups listed here would not have claimed because they were able to continue to work.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs, Offi ce for National Statistics, Treasury Select Committee and 
ExcludedUK information
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2.9 For SEISS, HMRC used self-assessment records up to and including 
the 2018-19 tax year, which meant that claims from around 0.2 million newly 
self-employed people were not allowed. Around 47,000 self-employed people who 
had not submitted their 2018-19 Self Assessment tax return on time were allowed 
to claim provided they submitted their return by 23 April 2020. However, people 
who had already submitted their Self Assessment returns were not allowed to 
amend them in order to increase their SEISS payment.7 In addition, a significant 
number of limited company directors who were mainly remunerated through 
company dividends were excluded because this is not treated as earnings by 
the tax system and tax returns do not disaggregate these data from investment 
dividends. Very small (micro) businesses and private limited companies have 
taken up the majority of business bounce back loans, suggesting many company 
directors have been able to access alternative government support on behalf of 
their companies, albeit in the form of repayable loans rather than income.8 
2.10 The number of self-employed people excluded could have been greater 
had lockdown occurred further from the annual tax return deadline. Lockdown 
occurred just two months after the deadline to submit a Self Assessment return, 
which meant the time period affecting the newly self-employed was relatively 
small. HMRC’s Making Tax Digital programme should enable more frequent 
(quarterly) reporting of income and expenditure. However, modernising the 
tax system is an extremely complex undertaking. HMRC was originally due to 
implement the programme by April 2019 but it is now scheduled to be in place 
from April 2023 for the self-employed.
2.11 Given the speed of their initial response to the crisis, the Departments 
were not able to fully work through the implications of their design decisions on 
different groups of taxpayers. Subsequently, the Departments adjusted processes 
and eligibility criteria, including:
• updating the online ‘eligibility checker’ – used by the self-employed to 
determine whether they would be eligible for SEISS. The details of some 
people who were late in filing tax returns were not available when the 
tool went live, and the checker concluded, wrongly, that some people 
were ineligible;
• allowing people on parental leave and around 200 military reservists to 
apply for both SEISS grants, even if they had not submitted a tax return 
in 2018-19. HMRC estimated that 10,000 people on parental leave may 
potentially be newly entitled by this adjustment but by late September only 
around 500 had applied; and
• HMRC manually entered the trading profits of 800 self-employed people 
to avoid a known technical issue preventing submission of their tax returns. 
7 Taxpayers could amend their returns for the calculation of tax due but amendments were disregarded for grant 
calculations to counter the risk of fraud.
8 Comptroller and Auditor General, Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Session 2019-2021, 
HC 860, National Audit Office, October 2020.
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The cost and impact of the schemes
2.12 HMRC forecasts total grant spending for the CJRS and SEISS 
schemes to reach £69.7 billion by the end of October 2020. It paid a total of 
£39.3 billion in CJRS grants to 20 September 2020 and the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) expects this to reach £54.5 billion by the end of the 
scheme.9 By 20 September 2020, SEISS claims had reached £13.4 billion. 
OBR forecasts total claims for the first two SEISS grants will reach £15.2 billion.
2.13 HMRC expects to spend around £98 million administering the schemes up 
to March 2021. The CJRS scheme will cost around £53 million to administer, and 
the SEISS scheme £45 million.
2.14 Data suggest the CJRS scheme has been successful in helping to protect 
jobs in the short term:
• The number of people in employment was broadly stable between April and 
August 2020 (Figure 7). 
• The number of redundancies between April and June 2020 was far lower 
than in the last global financial crisis: around 134,000 people were made 
redundant between April and June 2020 compared with 311,000 people 
made redundant between February and April 2009. 
• The number of furloughed jobs under the scheme has fallen steadily from 
a peak of 8.9 million in May 2020 to around five million by the end of July, 
while unemployment levels remained broadly stable at around 4% of the 
workforce. The absence of a significant deterioration in employment up 
to the end of July suggests that many furloughed employees returned to 
work (Figures 7 and Figure 8 on page 32). The Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) data also show that the furlough rate had fallen from around 30% of 
the workforce of UK businesses in May 2020 to 9%, or around two million 
employees, by mid-September.10
9 Grants paid under CJRS and SEISS are taxable so the net cost to the Exchequer will be lower. Table 3.4 in 
OBR’s July 2020 central estimate shows tax receipts of £5.2 billion for CJRS: Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Fiscal sustainability report, July 2020, p58, available at: https://obr.uk/fsr/fiscal-sustainability-report-july-2020
10 Office for National Statistics, Business impact of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Survey, Waves 6 and 14, June and 
October 2020, available at: www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/datasets/
businessimpactofcovid19surveybicsresults. Based on businesses that had not permanently stopped trading. 
This survey source is different from HMRC’s own data on CJRS scheme take-up.
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Figure 7
People in employment and employments furloughed under the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme (CJRS), January to August 2020


















January February March April May June July August 
Employees/employments (m)
Following a drop early on, the number of people in employment was stable during lockdown while the number of furloughed
jobs (employments) has since reduced from the April/May peak
Notes
1 The number of PAYE employees is based on experimental data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), and HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), 
using HMRC’s Real Time Information (RTI). This shows the number of employees on employer payrolls in the UK. 
2 The number of employees furloughed is based on publicly available HMRC CJRS statistics. We have calculated a monthly average of daily 
CJRS data for this figure between March and July 2020. Our average figure for March 2020 is only based on figures from 23 March 2020 
(the first working day after the announcement of CJRS) to 31 March 2020. The July 2020 figure of 5.6 million is an estimate based on 
HMRC’s latest published data which recorded an average 5.1 million cases across July but also estimated an uplift of around 10% in the final 
number for figures at 31 July.  
3 There is a distinction between the number of employees outlined in the PAYE data, and the number of employments furloughed under CJRS; 
an individual is counted once as a PAYE employee, but may work in two roles furloughed under CJRS. 
4 Figures for the number of employees furloughed under CJRS in August 2020 were not available at the time of publication.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Office for National Statistics’ records of HM Revenue & Customs’ Real Time Information employment data and 
HM Revenue & Customs’ CJRS data
2020
UK Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) employees
Average employments furloughed under CJRS




























Employments placed on furlough during the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS)
Employments furloughed (m)
 Recorded employments furloughed
 HM Revenue & Customs estimate ofJuly employments furloughed
Notes
1 This figure shows the number of employments or jobs placed on furlough each day during CJRS. In total 9.6 million individual employments were
placed on furlough during CJRS 1, but the highest amount of employments or jobs on furlough on a single day was 8.9 million on 8 May 2020.
2 HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) data for July 2020 are incomplete as not all claims and revisions have been submitted. HMRC estimates that 
the final level of claims for 31 July will be 10% higher than its current figure. Figures for the rest of July may also be incomplete. The secondary 
line in our chart inflates July’s current HMRC figures by 10% to give an indicative upper estimate of the level of claims for that month. 
3  CJRS was announced on 20 March 2020 and the first claims could be made on 20 April 2020. Claims could be backdated to 1 March 2020.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ CJRS statistics, August 2020
The number of furloughed employments peaked at 8.9 million on 8 May 2020
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2.15 However, a 0.5 million reduction in the number of people on employer 
payrolls in HMRC’s Real Time Information tax reporting system between 
March and April 2020 does suggest that some people were not covered by the 
support provided by these schemes at the outset. Between March and May 2020, 
the number of people not in employment on Universal Credit also increased by 
nearly 1.5 million. We surveyed employees to better understand their experiences 
during the first months of the CJRS scheme (see Appendix Two on the limits 
on the quota sampling methodology). More than half of respondents to our 
questions said that their main job had been impacted by COVID-19, with more 
than one-quarter saying they had been placed on the furlough scheme and 4% 
saying that they had been made redundant between March and June (Figure 9 
overleaf).11 Our survey also suggests that the initial requirement that furloughed 
employees should not work did help to keep costs down – around one-fifth of 
respondents were not placed on the furlough scheme, despite their hours of work 
or pay being reduced, presumably so they could keep working.
2.16 It is likely that the schemes will have supported some firms which would 
have otherwise failed, even without the pandemic. Data from the Insolvency 
Service shows that company insolvencies fell by around one-third between 
April and June 2020, compared with the previous year.12 The long-term impact 
of the schemes to protect jobs is unlikely to be known for some time, as firms 
struggle with the ongoing impact from the COVID-19 pandemic.
HMRC is commissioning further research to better understand 
take‑up of the schemes by different groups
2.17 HM Treasury considered the equality implications of the schemes as part 
of early work on their development. For CJRS, it noted that employers could 
discriminate between workers but concluded that furloughed workers would 
retain their employment rights. It also highlighted a risk that some women moving 
on to maternity leave could be affected if their reduced furloughed earnings were 
used in the calculation of maternity pay. 
2.18 For SEISS, HM Treasury recognised that some young people might be 
disadvantaged by the requirement for self-employed people to have traded in the 
2018-19 tax year. It also noted that people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage 
are more likely to be self-employed than the general population.
11 Based on 4,498 responses. We asked our survey questions as part of Ipsos MORI’s telephone and online 
omnibus surveys. The quota sampling methodology used and the limits of the approach in terms of how 
generalisable the results are to the wider population are set out in Appendix Two.
12 Some of this reduction will likely be because of reduced operational running of courts, temporary restrictions 
placed on the use of statutory demands and certain winding-up petitions during this time.
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2.19 HMRC’s further analysis to support its communication strategy showed 
that one-third of self-employed workers had a Black, Asian or minority ethnic 
background, with almost half based in London. HMRC developed a range of 
communication and engagement plans for the schemes and worked with ethnic 
minority and faith-based organisations to publicise the schemes.
2.20 For SEISS, HMRC has no data to monitor rates of take-up among different 
ethnic groups. Other than age and gender, protected characteristics’ data 
are not needed to calculate income tax. HMRC has also monitored take-up of 
SEISS for “customers who may need extra support to claim” who it identified 
from people using its ‘extra support’ service over the past 18 months. It also 
monitored potential claim rates among the ‘digitally excluded’ using data 
on Self Assessment ‘paper filers’. 
2.21 HMRC is planning further survey work to understand customer experience 
of the schemes across different claimant groups but most results from this 
work will not be available until after the current schemes are closed. HMRC 
also intends to survey employers eligible for CJRS who did not use the scheme. 
No equivalent work is planned for those who did not claim SEISS. 
2.22 HMRC has published extensive data on take-up for both schemes 
(Figure 10 overleaf). This data shows that a greater proportion of younger 
workers were furloughed compared with older workers, and that a greater 
proportion of men were furloughed overall, but this has reduced over time and 
by September there was little difference between men and women. For SEISS, 
a greater proportion of potentially eligible men took up the grant than did women. 
ONS data show that younger people were also far more likely to lose their jobs; 
there was a 5.9% decrease in employment levels of people aged 16–24 in June 
to August 2020 against the previous quarter, compared with a 0.5% decrease 
in overall employment levels.
2.23 HMRC’s data also include sectoral and regional information which enables 
an understanding of who has been using the schemes and in which locations. 
These data show that a greater proportion of employees from smaller employers 
were furloughed. Business sectors in retail, construction, accommodation and 
food services, manufacturing and transportation drew the largest amounts of 
financial support. There is close alignment between the sectors making greatest 
use of CJRS, SEISS and the Bounce Back Loan Scheme (Figure 11 on page 37).
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Figure 10
CJRS and SEISS: HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) data on take-up of schemes, end July 2020
Overall take-up
Notes
1 Taken from HMRC management information and published statistics on CJRS and SEISS. Estimates of value of claims to scheme end and 
average subsidy and grant values are taken from the Offi ce for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR’s) Fiscal Sustainability Report (July 2020). 
Claims paid data is to 20 September 2020.
2 Average subsidy and grant values are based on CJRS 1 rules and SEISS 1 rules. Changes to CJRS from 1 July 2020 and amended terms for 
the SEISS 2 will likely reduce these values.
3 Take-up data for employers and sectors, employees and individuals, and geography is based on CJRS 1 and SEISS 1. 
Figure 11 presents sector take-up by value of claims.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ and Offi ce for Budget Responsibility information
An uneven picture across industries, employers, individuals and geographies







Some 1.2 million employers (61%) received a grant 
covering 9.6 million employments (32%).
Some 2.6 million self-employed claimed (77% of HMRC’s 
estimate of the potentially eligible population of 3.4 million, 
and around half the self-employed population).
Employees of small- and micro-sized employers more 
than twice as likely to be furloughed as those working 
for large employers.
Employer take-up rates highest in Accommodation and 
Food Services; Arts Entertainment and Recreation; 
Construction and Manufacturing sectors.
Construction workers made 0.9 million claims for SEISS, 
one-third of all claims. 
Looking across age categories, a higher percentage of 
young workers under 25, were furloughed.
Overall, a greater proportion of employed men were 
furloughed than employed women.
Around 20% of furloughed employments at the end of 
July 2020 were partially furloughed under CJRS 2.
Highest take-up rates in parliamentary constituencies 
in Northern Ireland, the Welsh Valleys and North West 
Wales, the Glasgow City Region in Scotland and in parts 
of Northern England and North and East London 
Highest furlough rates in parliamentary constituencies in 
North West Wales, Cornwall, the Lake District, North and 
West London and West Sussex.
£13.4 billion of claims paid to 20 September 2020.
Estimated value of claims to end of SEISS 2 is £15.2 billion.
Estimated average value of claim per month around £970 
(SEISS 1).
£39.3 billion claims paid to 20 September 2020.
Estimated value of claims to scheme end is £54.5 billion.
Estimated average subsidy per job per month around 
£1,200.
Similar claim rates across age groups (though lower 
among 16–24 year olds and people over 65). 
Higher percentage of potentially eligible men claimed a 
SEISS grant, compared with the proportion of eligible 
women who claimed.
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2.24 Figure 12 and 13 on pages 38 and 39 show the rates at which grants have 
been claimed, by parliamentary constituency. CJRS take-up has been high in 
areas popular with tourists and communities close to major south-east airports. 
SEISS take-up has been highest in Northern Ireland, parts of Wales, areas 
around Glasgow, parts of northern England and the West Midlands, and North 
and East London. We found that areas that had periods of local restrictions since 
the lifting of the national lockdown had only a marginally greater proportion of 
self-employed people making claims under the first phase of the scheme.
Figure 11
Sectors accessing the most fi nancial support from the CJRS, SEISS 
and Bounce Back Loans
There is overlap between the employment support schemes and the Bounce Back loans
Rank Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme (CJRS) take-up 
by value
Self-Employment Income 
Support Scheme (SEISS) 
take-up by value
Bounce Back Loan 
market share
1 Wholesale and retail, 
repair of motor vehicles
Construction Real estate, professional 
services and 
support activities
2 Accommodation and 
food services
Unknown and other Wholesale and retail trade
3 Manufacturing Transportation and storage Construction
Notes
1 Bounce Back Loans support small businesses with loans of up to £50,000 or a maximum of 25% of turnover. 
The scheme was developed by HM Treasury, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
and the British Business Bank. It launched on 4 May 2020 and was expected to last for six months.
2 Offi ce for National Statistics Standard Industrial Classifi cation (SIC) 2007.
Source: National Audit offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ data on CJRS and SEISS and National Audit Offi ce 
analysis of British Business Bank and Bank of England data from our Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan 
Scheme report.
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Figure 12
Furloughing rates under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), CJRS 1
Furlough rates vary by parliamentary constituency with some of the highest in areas popular with tourists and those close 
to major south-east airports
Notes
1 Take-up rates were based on an employee’s last known home address.
2 HM Revenue & Customs was unable to match the data (and so assign a location) for 104,100 furloughed employments and 201,200 
eligible employments.
3 Map based on take-up data rounded to the nearest whole percent, using December 2019 parliamentary constituencies.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ data
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Figure 13
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) claims as a proportion of potentially eligible 
population, SEISS 1
Take-up rates of the first SEISS grant vary by parliamentary constituency with some of the highest rates in Northern Ireland,
parts of Wales, areas around Glasgow in Scotland, parts of northern England and the West Midlands, and North and East London
Notes
1 Take-up rates show the proportion of the potentially eligible population (when the scheme opened) that have applied and been paid
or are awaiting payment.
2 Take-up rates may have been higher than shown here since the potentially eligible population includes error and rejected cases,
and some individuals whose businesses have not been adversely affected by Coronavirus.
3 We have excluded 7,000 claimants and 12,000 potentially eligible individuals where addresses are listed in the Channel Islands,
Isle of Man, foreign addresses or missing and eligible Loan Charge cases who are yet to fi le their 2018-19 Self Assessment tax return.
4 Map based on take-up data rounded to the nearest whole percent, using December 2019 parliamentary constituencies.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ data
SEISS claims as a proportion of the potentially eligible 
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Many people remain furloughed as the Departments’ support moves 
to a new phase
2.25 Both schemes are due to end in their current form in October 2020. 
CJRS will be replaced by the Job Support Scheme (JSS). For the self-employed 
there is a modified SEISS scheme (see paragraphs 1.23 to 1.25 and Appendix 
Four). It is not yet certain how employers will respond to the JSS. The JSS 
scheme is intended to provide help for short-time working with government 
providing less support and employers expected to pay more. The expanded 
JSS is available for firms legally required to close. This will cover two-thirds of 
the wages of furloughed employees, without requiring an employer contribution.
2.26 With around two million people still furloughed at September 2020, there 
is a significant possibility of large-scale redundancies. Before the government’s 
recent announcement of its Winter Economy Plan and the JSS,13 HM Treasury 
published a summary of independent UK economy forecasts in September14 
which showed unemployment ranging from 6.2% to 12.7% (average 8.3%, 
around three million) by the final quarter of 2020. Analysis by the Institute for 
Employment Studies – published after the government’s Winter Economy Plan 
and expanded JSS – estimated around 600,000 redundancies in the final two 
quarters of 2020, based on employer redundancy notifications to employees. 
The latest unemployment data, published on 13 October, reported unemployment 
had reached 4.5% of the labour force in the three months to August 2020, an 
increase from 4.1% in the previous three months. 
2.27 The Departments will need to consider how the current schemes have 
operated to date, who has benefited and what this implies for the modified 
schemes going forward. For example, it is not yet clear how the government’s 
revised schemes will address the issue that some people will continue to be 
excluded from support based on the tax information held by HMRC. The expanded 
JSS scheme adds further administrative complexity with eligibility criteria based on 
location and lockdown restrictions in place at particular points in time.
13 HM Treasury, Policy Paper – Winter Economy Plan 2020, CP 297, September 2020, available at: www.gov.uk/
government/publications/winter-economy-plan/winter-economy-plan
14 HM Treasury, Forecasts for the UK Economy: September, September 2020, available at: www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/forecasts-for-the-uk-economy-september-2020
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2.28 It will be difficult to disentangle the specific impact of the existing schemes 
from other forms of government support (including the JSS and Bounce Back 
loans), as well as the ongoing impact of COVID-19. Recent analysis gives more 
insights into the range of effects of the schemes, finding that the average SEISS 
grant came close to fully compensating recipients for the effects of the crisis. 
However, furloughed employees under CJRS saw an average 13% decline in net 
income and new claimants of Universal Credit a 40% decline.15 Stakeholders, 
including the Treasury Select Committee, have suggested careful consideration 
should be given to extending employment support on a targeted basis, 
recognising that some sectors and regions may have been more acutely affected 
by COVID-19 than others. The Confederation of British Industry and the Trades 
Union Congress have both supported the measures announced in the Winter 
Economy Plan and believe the JSS will help to support some people to stay in 
work. The Resolution Foundation and Institute for Employment Studies have, 
however, questioned the extent to which the original JSS will prevent significant 
job losses over the coming months.
15 I Delestre et al, Income protection policy during COVID-19: evidence from bank account data, Briefing Note, 
10 September 2020, available at: www.ifs.org.uk/publications/15002
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Part Three
Fraud and error affecting the employment 
support schemes
3.1 The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS) are both grant schemes administered by 
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). Inevitably grant schemes are at risk of 
fraud and error:
• Fraud occurs where the claimant (the employer for CJRS, the 
self-employed individual for SEISS) deliberately sets out to misrepresent 
their circumstances to get money to which they are not entitled.
• Error occurs where the claimant inadvertently receives the wrong amount 
due to incorrect information being provided, but with no deliberate intent 
to mislead, or incorrectly calculate the award.
3.2 This part of the report considers HMRC’s:
• overall approach to compliance, including the control environment and 
its tolerance of risk;
• management of the fraud and error risks;
• understanding of the scale of fraud and error; and
• plans for recovering grant overpayments.
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HMRC’s compliance approach
The control environment
3.3 HMRC has a long-standing approach to tackling non-compliance. 
In administering the tax system and paying out tax credits, HMRC considers 
“the best way to tackle non-compliance is to prevent it happening in the first 
place, while cracking down on the minority who do break the rules”. 
3.4 In designing the schemes, HMRC recognised that it would need to make 
certain trade-offs in its normal approach of preventing as much fraud and error as 
possible and the need to ensure grants reached claimants quickly. HMRC drew up 
longlists of potential controls for both schemes. In total it identified 42 potential 
controls for CJRS, of which 24 were implemented by the go-live date and 57 for 
SEISS, of which 38 were delivered by the end of April. HMRC identified certain 
controls as critical to delivery and implemented all of these. It did not implement 
all possible controls because it viewed them either as unfeasible to deliver within 
the time available or not sufficiently effective. This was particularly the case for 
CJRS, which had to be implemented more quickly than SEISS (Figure 14 overleaf). 
HMRC’s COVID-19 compliance approach prioritised developing pre-payment 
checks to prevent risk of organised criminal attacks on the schemes over other 
types of risk such as opportunistic fraud, where there is a greater likelihood it can 
recover overpayments retrospectively.
3.5 HMRC has maintained strong oversight of its control framework for both 
schemes, which sets out in detail what all the controls do, the stage of the claims 
process they operate in and the risks they were seeking to mitigate against 
(Figure 15 on page 45).
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Figure 14
Examples of key controls for Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS)
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) had less time to develop controls for CJRS than for SEISS
CJRS SEISS Why was control not implemented?
Promote Honesty declaration  
Online fraud reporting form  
Promote threat of future compliance action  
Public listing of claimants  N/A HMRC not convinced measure would 
be effective.
Online guidance and calculator  
HMRC invitation to apply   Up to employer to assess need for the scheme.
Prevent Checking work status with furloughed employees  N/A Insufficient time/resources.
Automated calculation of award N/A 
Full verification of all input data and amounts claimed 
per employee
 N/A Insufficient time/resources.
Payments capped at maximum grant award value  
Employee/self-employed person must already be in 
HMRC’s tax systems to be eligible
 
Agents prevented from claiming   HMRC viewed CJRS risk as acceptable.
Transaction monitoring  
Bank account checks  
Respond Data matching to detect potential non-compliance  
Voluntary disclosure window  
One-to-one enquiries  
  means that the control was implemented.      indicates that the control was not implemented.    
Notes
1 The controls listed above are not exhaustive lists.
2 An online fraud reporting form was in place for both schemes. The telephone hotline was not available until August 2020 due to
home-working restrictions during the pandemic.
3 Online guidance was available for the SEISS as well as information about how the calculation was made. The calculation itself, however,
was automated by HMRC.
4 HMRC sent out communications to registered Self Assessment taxpayers notifying them that they may be eligible to apply for the SEISS.
For CJRS, no such communication was made but HMRC did contact some of the largest companies to check whether they intended to apply.
5 Furloughed employees were not able to do any work under the original rules of the CJRS. From 1 July 2020, however, they could work part-time.
6 An employee had to be registered on the employer’s Pay-As-You-Earn scheme by 19 March and included on a Real Time Information submission 
made by the same date to be eligible for CJRS. Self-employed individuals had to be already registered on HMRC’s Self Assessment system to be 
eligible for the SEISS.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ control frameworks
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Figure 15
HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) control framework for the employment support schemes
HMRC’s control framework enabled it to effectively document risks and the controls in place to tackle them
HMRC used its control framework for Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme. 
Through using it, HMRC aimed to properly understand and own the scheme risks across the organisation. The framework 
is influenced by the principles of the government’s Orange Book guidance, designed to support departments to better 
manage risk.
Control sheets are used to show progress and to ensure that the control environment is operating as expected. The sheets 
were updated regularly as new controls were brought in and existing ones updated, thus ensuring HMRC had a comprehensive 
overview of the overall controls regime.
A control listing sheet was used for each scheme to document controls around different phases of customer claims. 
Each control had a named owner responsible for monitoring it.
Pre-claim:
For example, controls 
around eligibility issues.
Between claims: 










Control owners reported on progress weekly. A Control Board produced a weekly update on controls that was submitted 
to HMRC’s Executive and Audit Committees.
Note
1 HMRC documented controls for manual claims using the same approach.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ control framework
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HMRC’s assessment of risk
3.6 HMRC conducted a detailed initial risk assessment on both schemes to 
establish the key fraud and error risks. For example, HMRC was almost certain 
that organised criminals would target the system for weaknesses and viewed 
the likelihood of opportunistic fraud, where claimants exploit the rules of the 
scheme to their own advantage, as being very likely (Figure 16). As such, 
HMRC recommended limiting the schemes only to taxpayers with current 
records, a move that reduced the risk of fraud considerably because applicants 
had to be known to HMRC at the time the schemes were announced.
3.7 HMRC has assessed that the risk of fraud and error is greater for the CJRS 
scheme than for SEISS as it was able to put in place more preventative controls 
for SEISS (Figure 14). For SEISS, Self Assessment taxpayers were invited to 
apply, rather than for CJRS where taxpayers could make applications themselves. 
It also calculated the SEISS grant using existing tax return data. This reduced the 
scope for individuals to either erroneously or deliberately misstate their incomes 
to increase their claim award.
3.8 Under the CJRS scheme, employers were responsible for informing 
employees about whether they were being furloughed under the government 
scheme and for making payments to them. Employers retained the responsibility 
for calculating claims. The scheme allowed a degree of tolerance around 
the amounts employers applied for, up to a maximum of £2,500 a month per 
employee. HMRC did not ask small employers to state how much was being 
claimed for each employee because it concluded it was not feasible to build this 
into the new system in the time available. HMRC considered validating claim 
amounts for employees but rejected this because the range of variations seen 
in people’s pay (for example, from promotions or performance-related pay) would 
have introduced too much complexity. HMRC’s internal audit team warned before 
the scheme went live that checks on amounts claimed per employee were critical 
to effective and efficient compliance. 
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Figure 16
HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) early assessment of the key fraud and error risks
HMRC identified the same key risks for both schemes but assessed the impacts to be potentially greater for the 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS)
Assessment of Risk
Key risks Examples Likelihood Impact after mitigation (% of 
total grant expenditure)
CJRS
Organised crime Pay-As-You-Earn schemes hijacked by organised 
criminal gangs.
Almost certain 2.5% to 5%
Opportunistic fraud Employer gets furloughed employee to 
continue working.
Employer doesn’t pass on furlough payments 
to employee.
Employer inflates claim for employee.
Highly likely 2% to 3%
Internal fraud HMRC staff member colludes with employer. Low Low
Error Employer claims incorrect amount per employee or 
HMRC processes award incorrectly.
Low 1% to 2%




Organised crime Hijacking of claimant details by organised 
criminal gangs.
Almost certain 0.3% to 1.5%
Opportunistic fraud Claimant makes a late filing that deliberately inflates 
their profits.
Highly likely 0.3% to 0.7%
Internal fraud HMRC staff member falsifies details to claim 
grant money.
Low Low
Error Wrong amount is awarded based on incorrect data. Low 0.2% to 0.5%
Total 1% to 2%
Notes
1 The likelihood assessments use a probability yardstick. An assessment of ‘almost certain’ indicates a probability in excess of 95%. 
A ‘highly likely’ assessment has a probability of 80% to 90%.
2 The estimates above were provisional as they were based on an early assessment of the risks and carried signifi cant levels of uncertainty. 
HMRC has committed to further updates on the likely levels of fraud and error by the end of 2020.
3 The totals do not exactly match the sum of the individual components. This is because the total are calculated using Monte Carlo modelling. 
This is a good-practice approach that varies key inputs and risk factors to produce a range of estimated scenarios. This means, however, 
that the most likely values of total fraud and error are expected to sit within a much narrower range than is implied by simply aggregating 
the most extreme values from each scenario.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ risk assessments of the schemes
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Tolerance of risk
3.9 In order to get money to claimants quickly HMRC accepted some factors 
would contribute to significant fraud and error risks. These factors included: 
• reducing the scope for preventative controls. HMRC gave itself a maximum 
of three days to validate CJRS and SEISS claims so it could make payments 
as quickly as possible. This is much faster than for Tax Credits and Child 
Benefit, where the target for both is 22 days;
• HMRC not initially having the powers to undertake compliance work for the 
grant schemes, as with tax investigations, and it could only investigate cases 
where it suspected criminal intent. This delayed its ability to commence 
compliance work until the 2020 Finance Act passed into law in July;
• processing large volumes of claims quickly, HMRC needed to prioritise 
preventative checks for the most high-risk cases. This meant concentrating 
on suspected cases of organised crime, where the potential to recover money 
is normally much more difficult than for opportunistic fraud committed by 
known taxpayers. HMRC’s decision to send out invitations for SEISS over a 
four-day period further narrowed its window to perform preventative checks. 
The invitations to apply over a four-day period resulted in four times as many 
SEISS claims in the first week compared with CJRS; and
• HMRC concluding that it had limited control of the relationship between 
employers and employees. It recognised there were risks that employers claim 
furlough money while continuing to get their employees to work but decided 
that it would need to tackle this risk in post-payment checks. We consider 
HMRC’s management of furlough fraud in paragraphs 3.11 to 3.19. 
How HMRC has managed risks
3.10 We looked in more detail at three key risks which HMRC viewed as 
almost certain or highly likely. We considered: how HMRC assessed the risk; 
the mitigation controls it put in place; and the extent to which these controls 
operated effectively: 
1 Employers claiming money while their furloughed employees 
continue to work. 
2 Self-employed individuals inflating their claims in late Self 
Assessment returns.
3 Organised criminals hijacking agents’ details to submit fraudulent claims.
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1. Working while furloughed
3.11 Under CJRS an employer commits ‘furlough fraud’ if they claim furlough 
payments for an employee but continued to require them to work (in any capacity 
under the first phase of the scheme (CJRS 1), or on a full-time basis under the 
second phase of the scheme (CJRS 2)). Other forms of furlough fraud include 
employers falsely inflating the amount of grants they claim or failing to pass on 
the full amount of furlough payments due to their employees.16 
3.12 HMRC recognised that there was a high risk that employers would exploit 
the initial CJRS rules and continue to get their employees to work for them 
while claiming support. It informed the Chancellor it could not establish strong 
preventative controls. The only specific controls in place for the risk were an 
honesty declaration in the online form, whistleblowing routes, other forms 
of intelligence and retrospective investigation. HMRC set up an online fraud 
reporting form in addition to its telephone hotline. The telephone hotline was not 
available for the duration of CJRS 1 because home-working restrictions meant 
staff could not take calls in a secure environment.
3.13 HMRC ruled out further checks which could have helped to mitigate the 
specific risk of furlough fraud. It considered that pre-payment checks were 
impractical in the timeframe. The potential to contact furloughed employees 
retrospectively to check whether they were working was considered but ruled 
out on the basis it would be too resource-intensive and require resources to be 
diverted away from helping employers make claims. 
3.14 Employees did not know if their employer was part of the government furlough 
scheme unless their employer informed them. HMRC ruled out publishing the 
details of every company claiming furlough payments, which might have alerted 
some employees that their employer was acting fraudulently. HMRC concluded 
it would have been unrealistic to contact employees given the large numbers of 
recipients of the furlough scheme. It was also concerned that naming companies 
could deter too many legitimate claimants and be detrimental to the primary 
policy objective to get support to those who needed it. HMRC believed it had 
comprehensive and robust controls to mitigate the risk of fraud.
3.15 HMRC has announced additional controls for the Job Support Scheme (JSS) 
to deter fraud and to prompt employees to disclose fraud. It intends to publish 
the names of employers who have used the scheme and it will use personal tax 
accounts to inform employees that their employer has claimed JSS. 
16 Under SEISS, self-employed individuals were free to continue trading while claiming the grant providing that they 
stated that their business had been ‘adversely affected’ by COVID-19.
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3.16 Up to 14 August, employees reported 8,600 potential fraud abuses through 
the online form, with 8,100 of these relating to CJRS. The telephone hotline 
received a further 1,600 reports, bringing total reported cases to more than 
10,000.17 The Department’s experience, however, is that whistleblowing is only 
likely to identify 1% to 3% of fraud cases.
3.17 HMRC has investigated around one-quarter of CJRS fraud allegations 
reported online. Of those investigated, the majority of allegations relate to 
employers asking employees to work while furloughed (Figure 17). In around 8% 
of cases, the employer has admitted some form of error. Only one employer has 
accepted that they deliberately falsified their claim. In the remaining 92% of 
cases, the employer has either refused to engage with HMRC to date or denied 
any wrongdoing. HMRC continues to pursue these cases. HMRC has considered 
naming employers who are subsequently found to have committed fraud. Under 
its compliance powers received in July 2020 it can now do so but is yet to 
exercise these powers.
17 A very small number of these relate to potential fraud in the Statutory Sick Pay Rebate (SSPR) that HMRC 





















Allegations of Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme fraud received 
through online form
Percentage (%)
The majority (62%) of allegations of fraud concern employees being asked to work by their employer 
while furloughed
Note
1 Data are based off 2,205 calls made up to 7 August 2020. In some instances, multiple allegations are made in 
one call, so the total number of allegations (2,453) exceeds the number of calls. 
Source: HM Revenue & Customs’ analysis of post-payment calls
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3.18 Our survey looked at the possible extent of employees working while on 
furlough (for full details of the survey see Appendix Two). This found that 9% of 
survey respondents who reported being furloughed had done some work at the 
request of their employer.18 An additional 6% reported that they had chosen to 
do some work despite not being asked to by their employer.19 In addition, we also 
found that a further 4% of respondents to our survey who had not worked while 
furloughed said that their employer had paid them less than 80% of their pay, the 
minimum amount under CJRS.20 
3.19 Surveys by other organisations have different results, with the 
overall percentage of furloughed employees working at the request of their 
employer ranging from 7% to 34% (see Figure 18 overleaf). Different sampling 
methodologies, question framings and time periods surveyed are likely to 
account for some of this variation. The survey commissioned by the National 
Audit Office covers CJRS 1 while the other surveys covered narrower periods 
in time. HMRC has not carried out its own survey of furlough fraud but it was 
considering this option in September 2020, when we were finalising our fieldwork.
18 Based on 1,178 survey responses. We asked our survey questions as part of Ipsos MORI’s telephone omnibus 
and online surveys. The quota sampling methodology used and the limits of the approach in terms of how 
generalisable the results are to the population of furloughed workers are set out in Appendix Two.
19 Based on 1,178 survey responses.
20 Based on a sample of 503 computer-assisted telephone interviews. Due to an error in the online survey routing, 
the base size for this particular question is smaller than for our other survey questions.
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Figure 18
Surveys looking at percentage of furloughed employees working
Furlough fraud could be in the range of 7% to 34% according to surveys
Organisation Percentage of furloughed 







Period of lockdown 
covered by survey
Academics at Oxford, 
Cambridge and 
Zurich universities
19 44 April 2020
Crossland 
Employment Solicitors
34 N/A March to 
11 June 2020
National Audit Office 
(NAO)
9 6 March to June 2020
Resolution Foundation 7 N/A May 2020
Notes
1 The NAO survey was conducted by Ipsos MORI on our behalf. In our survey, 12% of employees who had been 
furloughed responded that their employer had asked them to work, 9% had done so and 3% had not done so.
2 The survey we commissioned from Ipsos MORI combined online and telephone surveying (weighted 50:50). 
While showing survey results for each method should be treated with caution because it results in smaller 
response samples, we found different results across the two methods: 4% of furloughed respondents who 
were contacted by telephone said that their employer had asked them to work and they had done so; 14% 
of furloughed respondents who were contacted online said that their employer had asked them to work and 
they had done so. These differences refl ect variations between the populations from which the samples 
were drawn; as well as nuances in job sector, type of employment and the mode of interview (self-completion 
versus interview-led telephone interviewing).
3 Crossland Employment Solicitors, Resolution Foundation and the Academics at Oxford, Cambridge and Zurich 
universities all used online panels for their surveys.
4 The Resolution Foundation’s survey, conducted by YouGov, found that 7% of employees had been asked 
to work by their employer. It did not ask whether these employees complied with the request.
5 The surveys by Crossland Employment Solicitors and Resolution Foundation did not ask employees whether 
they had voluntarily worked while placed on furlough.
6 Information about the polling methodologies used by other organisations can be seen in the source links below. 
For further information on the survey methodology adopted by Ipsos MORI on our behalf see Appendix Two. 
We did not directly validate the results of any of the other surveys listed here.
Sources: Crossland Employment Solicitors survey results are available at: www.crosslandsolicitors.com/site/media/
coronavirus-hub/furlough-fraud-coronavirus-lockdown; The Resolution Foundation survey results are available 
at: www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/the-effects-of-the-coronavirus-crisis-on-workers/; The Oxford, 
Cambridge and Zurich University paper is available at: www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-fi les/repec/cam/pdf/
cwpe2079.pdf
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2. Late Self Assessment returns
3.20 SEISS was announced less than two months after the Self Assessment 
deadline meaning that many taxpayers had not yet filed their returns or still 
intended to submit amendments. HMRC identified significant risks for taxpayers 
to inflate the value of their returns in order to obtain larger grants under the 
SEISS scheme, although this would also have increased their future tax liability. 
To mitigate this risk it: 
• did not allow amendments to already-filed returns to be included in 
calculating the grant because it assessed the fraud risk was too high. 
Any amendments to filed Self Assessment tax returns after SEISS was 
announced on 26 March 2020 were disregarded in calculating an individual’s 
award. An individual may have had a legitimate reason for making such an 
amendment but HMRC was concerned about the potential for manipulation. 
Subsequent analysis of amended returns suggests HMRC’s concerns were 
well founded; taxpayers filed 7,000 amendments the day after the policy was 
announced with 1,200 of these seeking to increase their trading income by 
an average of £7,000; and
• permitted late returns but sought to perform additional ID verification 
checks on these before receiving the SEISS claims. Between 26 March and 
23 April 2020, 64,000 late returns were filed by self-employed individuals, 
with 47,000 of these deemed potentially eligible for the SEISS grant. 
HMRC performed ID verification checks on around 15% (7,000) of these 
high-risk late returns. Of those 7,000 returns, just over 40% failed these 
verification checks. Of those that passed the verification checks, 11% were 
flagged for post-payment compliance checks. While HMRC detected high 
levels of risk in the sample it checked, it did not carry out additional checks 
on the other 85% of late returns, instead relying on its standard risk rules 
applied to all SEISS claims. HMRC told us those standard risk rules were 
updated to recognise the fact that SEISS claims based on late returns 
should be viewed as high risk. However, this only allowed HMRC 72 hours 
to decide whether to accept or reject the claim.
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3. Hijacked claims by organised crime
3.21 Organised criminals could exploit the schemes by stealing the identities of 
legitimate taxpayers or coercing them to make fraudulent claims. HMRC identified 
a risk that if agent details were stolen, fraudsters would potentially be able to 
make fraudulent claims on behalf of large numbers of employers or individuals. 
Agents or third parties submitted more than half (56%) of Self Assessment 
returns in 2018-19. HMRC research suggests around 50% of CJRS claims 
were made through agents. 
3.22 Given the timescales for implementing SEISS, HMRC concluded it 
could not develop a claims service for agents that would also mitigate the 
risk of exploitation by organised crime. It therefore focused on developing 
a system that would be easy for customers to use directly and said it would 
not accept applications for SEISS from agents. It did not operate the same 
restriction for CJRS.
• For SEISS, HMRC stipulated that self-employed people must make an 
application themselves. It monitored activity and prevented some large-scale 
attempts to attack the system. Over a single weekend in May 2020, HMRC 
blocked around 87,000 claims worth £242 million due to suspicious activity. 
It did not have the capacity to assess all these claims within the three-day 
period and acted prudently to halt the applications. It recognised it could 
have denied some legitimate claims and subsequently contacted nearly 
all of these claimants to encourage them to claim themselves rather than 
through agents.
• HMRC did not take the same approach on the CJRS, allowing agents to 
continue to make applications on behalf of employers, even where the 
employer had not explicitly consented to this. It did alert businesses through 
their online business tax accounts that claims had been made in their name, 
but not until August 2020. This meant businesses may not have been 
aware that their details had been hijacked and used to make a claim during 
the first months of the scheme. HMRC also worked proactively to shut 
down a number of online scams that had been circulating that seek to trick 
individuals into passing on personal details.
• HMRC has detected relatively few CJRS claims where credentials may have 
been hijacked. It has rejected 224 CJRS claims to date worth £10 million. 
However, hijacked cases may have gone undetected. Until HMRC has 
carried out enquires into cases it cannot be sure it has not failed to prevent 
more attacks. HMRC continues to monitor organised criminal attacks but 
has yet to assess its effectiveness in mitigating the risk. 
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Understanding the scale of fraud and error
3.23 HMRC is unlikely to know the total level of fraud and error in each of the 
schemes for some time. Its planning assumptions were based on comparisons to 
Tax Credits, Universal Credit and Income Tax Self Assessment repayment fraud. 
Based on these it initially estimated potential fraud and error levels of 5% to 
9% in CJRS and 1% in SEISS. At the time the assessments were made, HMRC’s 
internal audit function concluded that the comparators were not sufficiently 
reliable to make conclusive assessments about the scale of the risk.
3.24 HMRC’s most recent analysis predicts similar rates of 5% to 10% for 
CJRS and 1% to 2% for SEISS (see Figure 16). This would equate to around 
£2.0 billion to £3.9 billion on the CJRS and £130 million to £270 million on 
the SEISS based on spend to date. HMRC told us that while these estimates 
remained assumption-based, they were informed by expert opinion and it 
was continuing to update the estimates with information collected during the 
schemes. HMRC believes that the CJRS was less susceptible to organised crime 
than it initially forecast but also acknowledges that the greater flexibility in the 
rules that allowed part-time working from 1 July increased the risk of genuine 
error and more opportunistic fraud. 
3.25 Survey data (see Figure 18) indicates that the true level of fraud and error 
in the CJRS could be considerable. Surveys suggest that furlough fraud due 
to employees working at the request of their employer could be in the range 
of 7% to 34%. We also found 4% of respondents to our survey who had not 
worked while furloughed said that their employer had paid them less than 80% 
of their pay, the minimum amount under CJRS (see paragraph 3.18).21 Making a 
precise estimate is complicated because part-time working was allowed in CJRS 
2, and the work employees carried out in CJRS 1 may have been on a part-time 
basis.22 HMRC will need to consider whether the spirit of the rules have been 
broken and weigh this against the need to treat those who followed the rules 
fairly. Of those respondents to our survey who had said that they had worked 
while furloughed at the employer’s request, almost two-thirds said they did so 
for less than half of their usual hours.23 
21 Based on a sample of 503 computer-assisted telephone interviews. Due to an error in the online survey routing, 
the base size for this particular question is smaller than for our other survey questions.
22 There were some very limited circumstances in CJRS 1 where working while furloughed was allowed, such as a 
director carrying out director’s duties.
23 Based on 1,178 survey responses, of which 117 indicated that they had worked while furloughed at the 
employer’s request. These are raw respondent counts rather than the weighted ones used for calculation of 
proportions elsewhere in this report. See Appendix 2 for further detail.
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3.26 HMRC intends to produce a final statistical estimate on both schemes for 
total levels of error and fraud. It aims to refine its provisional estimates again 
by the end of 2020 and in spring 2021 as it undertakes more compliance work 
and receives more operational intelligence. HMRC is monitoring the level of 
organised criminal attack. It does not expect to produce final estimates until the 
end of 2021 at the earliest. It intends to use similar methodologies to those used 
in estimating the tax gap. We recently reported on HMRC’s assessment of the 
tax gap, noting that it is a comprehensive assessment but with some inevitable 
uncertainty attached.24 There will also be parallels with the work that HMRC does 
in measuring error and fraud in Tax Credits and Child Benefit, as well as the work 
the Department for Work & Pensions does in measuring fraud and error in the 
benefits system. 
3.27 HMRC has made some errors resulting in overpayments of grants worth 
£14 million. In the first tranche of SEISS payments, 26,000 were miscalculated 
due to not all tax return data being considered. Around 13,000 of these led to 
overpayments worth £12 million, equivalent to less than 1% of all SEISS grants. 
On CJRS, around £3 million was overpaid on 330 cases that were manually 
processed by HMRC staff. There are also likely to be cases where employers 
overclaimed CJRS because the HMRC online calculation tool was not accurate. 
HMRC made changes to the tool in May to rectify identified problems. HMRC does 
not intend to recover these overpayments despite having the legal powers to do so. 
3.28 Up to 13 October, companies had paid back £278 million in grant money 
claimed under the CJRS. The amounts were claimed in error or were amounts 
that the company subsequently decided they did not need as they adapted to 
the pandemic.
24 Comptroller and Auditor General, Tackling the tax gap, Session 2019–2021, HC 372, National Audit Office, 
July 2020.
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Post‑payment compliance
3.29 HMRC has set out how it intends to deal with potential non-compliance 
post-payment. For CJRS, it has set up an approach which gives it multiple 
opportunities to recover overpayments (Figure 19). HMRC has already made 
three arrests in relation to suspected CJRS fraud. For SEISS, work commenced in 
October 2020 targeting the highest risk areas using a similar campaign approach 
to CJRS. Further SEISS risks will be considered as part of the compliance checks 
on the 2020-21 Self Assessment tax returns that will be due by January 2022.
Figure 19
HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) post-payment compliance regime for Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (CJRS)
HMRC’s post-payment compliance regime has yet to produce tangible results in terms of recovery of overpayments
CJRS compliance 
campaign
What is it? Results to date
Claims assurance checks 2,800 calls to employers during the scheme 
to understand more about their claims.
18% of calls have identified errors resulting 
in overpayments.
20% of calls have identified errors but with 
no net overpayment.
63% of calls either not answered, customer 
unable/unwilling to speak or no error identified.
90-day disclosure window 
to 20 October 2020
Amnesty period for employers to encourage 
them to disclose any overclaims during the 
disclosure window.
27,000 letters sent out.
136 notifications of overpayments received 
but too early to evaluate response rates.
One-to-one enquiries For remaining high-risk claimants who have 
not corrected their claims.
10,000 enquiries anticipated, subject to 
the number of voluntary disclosures.
Protection against 
deliberate insolvency
To protect taxpayer money where companies 
look to deliberately enter insolvency.
Notes
1 Percentages for claims assurance checks calls do not sum due to rounding.
2 Total number of claims assurance checks based on data as at 7 August 2020. HMRC made the decision to discontinue these calls from 
August onwards instead shifting its focus into other post-payment compliance activity.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of HM Revenue & Customs’ documentation
58 Part Three Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
3.30 HMRC plans to redeploy 500 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff to enable 
post-payment compliance work. Its assessment in June 2020 suggested that 
this work would bring in around £275 million. The work offers a positive return 
on investment (we estimate around 9:1) but HMRC estimates it would come 
with an opportunity cost to tax revenue of £100 million to £200 million as it 
would need to redeploy staff from tax compliance. HMRC does not believe it 
can recruit additional staff because there is an 18-month time-lag between 
starting recruitment and getting staff fully trained to start work. In June 2020 it 
considered outsourcing but concluded at that stage that there were no existing 
commercial mechanisms to recruit at the speed it needed. It was also concerned 
about the challenges experienced through outsourcing HMRC functions in the 
past (such as using Concentrix to administer Tax Credits’ claims) and that this 
would not be worthwhile given furlough arrangements may not be extended, 
making this a one-off. In October 2020 HMRC informed us that with the 
announcement of new employment support schemes, and informed by learning 
from the operation of SEISS and CJRS, it was now planning to use private 
contractors to supplement its compliance capacity where necessary.
3.31 Until it has a robust estimate of the total levels of error and fraud, HMRC 
cannot reasonably know how much resource it should commit to recovery. 
Its provisional assessment of £275 million is based on investigating around 
30% (10,000 claims) of the highest-risk CJRS cases. If total levels of error and 
fraud prove to be higher than initially forecast the work may take some time to 
complete. HMRC will also need to consider the long-term impact of the pandemic 
and the risks this poses to tax revenue and the ability of taxpayers to repay 
grants in the short-term.
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 This report examines the role of HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) in implementing the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the 
Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS). The report considers how 
well the schemes were implemented, recognising the need to deliver at speed in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our key audit questions were:
• Did HMRC and HM Treasury manage design and delivery risks effectively 
in implementing the schemes?
• Do HMRC and HM Treasury understand whether the schemes reached the 
people intended?
• Are HMRC and HM Treasury managing fraud and error risks effectively 
thus far?
2 This report does not consider HMRC’s other COVID-19 interventions 
designed to support businesses, including the Coronavirus Job Retention Bonus 
and Eat Out to Help Out, or the relationship between the schemes and wider 
government support such as business loans and benefits. We have previously 
reported on the Bounce Back Loans Scheme. 
3 Our audit approach is summarised in Figure 20 overleaf.
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Figure 20
Our audit approach
The objective of 
government






(see Appendix Two 
for details)
Our conclusions
Interviews with key HMRC and 
HM Treasury staff.
Document review, including 
ministerial submissions on 
scheme design.
International comparisons 
using data from other 
audit institutions.
Review of key documents, 
including control frameworks.
Review and analysis of any 
emerging evidence on fraud 
and error levels.
Interviews with key HMRC and 
HM Treasury staff.
Analysis of our survey data.
Did HMRC and HM Treasury 
manage design and 
delivery risks effectively in 
implementing the schemes? 
Have HMRC and HM Treasury 
managed fraud and error risk 
effectively thus far?
Do HMRC and HM Treasury 
understand whether the 
schemes reached the 
people intended?
Interviews with key HMRC and 
HM Treasury staff.




Analysis of our survey data.
To provide support for businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic to enable them to retain 
employees and to provide support to self-employed individuals whose businesses were adversely affected 
by the pandemic.
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and HM Treasury together designed two grant schemes: the Coronavirus 
Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) to support businesses; and, for self-employed individuals, the Self-Employment 
Income Support Scheme (SEISS).
We examined how HMRC and HM Treasury designed and delivered these two support schemes, recognising 
the need to deliver at speed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
HM Treasury and HMRC met their objective to rapidly implement the schemes and the Departments should 
be commended for making these available ahead of schedule. The schemes were relatively straightforward to 
apply for, and payments quickly reached those who applied. Indications are that this has helped to protect jobs 
in the short-term and the numbers of people moving from furlough arrangements back to work are encouraging. 
However, many other people have lost earnings and have not been able to access support. The long-term 
impact of the schemes will also depend on wider financial support and the ongoing impact of COVID-19.
A key value-for-money test for these schemes will be how far the Departments can mitigate fraud and error. 
The pace at which the schemes were designed and implemented meant the Departments had to accept a 
greater risk than normal. As such, there are likely to be considerable amounts of fraud and error, particularly 
on the furlough scheme. Limiting applications to existing taxpayers should have reduced the fraud risk, but 
HMRC could have done more to make clear to employees whether their employer was part of the furlough 
scheme. In future, the Departments should do more while employment support schemes are running to 
protect employees and counter acts of fraud. The Departments will need to ensure sufficient resources are 
committed to recover money where it is cost-effective to do so.
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 Our conclusions on the two employment support schemes were reached 
based on our analysis of evidence collected between June and October 2020. 
Our overall audit approach is outlined in Appendix One.
Using our back catalogue
2 In designing and carrying out our work we took account of previous National 
Audit Office (NAO) analysis examining the Departments’ responses to financial 
and humanitarian crises using the learning from this work to inform our evaluative 
criteria. We also deployed our framework for assessing the Departments’ 
approaches to managing fraud and error, an audit method that builds on 
significant past experience of government interventions. 
Departmental meetings and information
3 We met with key officials from both HM Treasury and HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC) involved in the design and delivery of the schemes. Specifically:
• the senior responsible owners for both the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), 
and the key staff members supporting them;
• staff from HMRC’s Customer Compliance Directorate who led on the 
compliance regime for both; 
• HMRC’s internal audit team, who offered initial advice to their Departmental 
colleagues on the appropriateness of the schemes’ control environments;
• staff from HMRC’s Knowledge, Analysis and Innovation Team to discuss the 
monitoring and evaluation of the schemes; and
• staff from HMRC’s Behavioural Insights and Trials Team.
4 We reviewed relevant documents, including: options papers, ministerial 
submissions and strategy documents, accounting officer advice, controls 
frameworks, risk and decision logs, scheme overviews and customer journey maps, 
lessons-learned documents, performance dashboards and internal audit papers. 
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Stakeholders and experts
5 We reviewed key external reports and data sources including those 
published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Treasury 
Select Committee.
6 We engaged with experts from the Institute for Government, National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research, and the Resolution Foundation. 
We also discussed with the authors the results of findings from a survey 
conducted by Dr Abigail Adams-Prassl and colleagues from Oxford, Cambridge 
and Zurich universities. We corresponded with Crossland Employment Solicitors 
in relation to their survey work. For the surveys featured in Figure 18 in the 
report, we asked: who conducted the survey; what questions were asked 
about furloughed working; and over what time period the survey was carried 
out. We have not audited the underlying data.
Survey research
7 To gain feedback from employees furloughed as part of CJRS, we 
commissioned Ipsos MORI to carry out primary survey research on our behalf. 
Ipsos MORI interviewed a sample of 8,445 adults aged 18+ in the UK using a 
quota sampling method. Research was conducted using its telephone omnibus 
and online interviews. For both methodologies, quotas were set on age, gender, 
working status, education level, ethnicity and government office region to 
reflect the general population. The quotas were set based on the 2020 mid-year 
population estimates for UK adults 18+ published by the ONS. Quota sampling 
techniques provide accurate information about the responding sample, but 
findings derived from this approach cannot generally be used to make inferences 
about a wider population in the same way as having taken an entirely random 
sample of respondents from a defined population, where each potential 
participant has a known probability of being selected.
8 A total of 4,367 interviews were conducted via the telephone (CATI) 
omnibus between 14 August and 2 October 2020. The CATI omnibus is a 
nationally representative sample of adults (18+) using standard landline Random 
Digit Dialling (RDD), mobile RDD and targeted mobile samples. Interviewing took 
place over a four-week period, from a Friday to the following Wednesday and 
interviewing was conducted between 9am and 9pm on weekdays and 10am 
to 7pm on weekends.
Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic Appendix Two 63 
9 A total of 4,078 interviews were conducted online between 26 August and 
8 September 2020. For the online survey, a nationally representative sample 
of adults aged 18+ were interviewed online. The research was conducted by 
contacting respondents through Ipsos Interactive Services. The panel consists 
of individuals who have volunteered to take part in market research surveys. 
The respondent panel is continuously maintained and monitored on response 
rates, attrition, data quality and respondent engagement, as well as on 
demographic composition to ensure gender, age, regional and socio-economic 
representation. Panellists receive appropriate incentives to participate in 
surveys. Email invitations were sent out to the selected respondents, with a 
unique survey link for each respondent. Respondents participating in the study 
were actively monitored during fieldwork across a number of criteria, such as 
response time, multiple participation, and so forth, and this process was repeated 
at the end of fieldwork. Of the sample, 47 cases were removed as a result of 
noticeable primacy effect, speeding or odd answer profiles and are not included 
in the totals above.
10 Telephone and online data were weighted separately to the known offline 
population proportions for age within gender, social grade within gender, region 
within gender, working status within gender, ethnicity and education using rim 
weighting. The weight targets were based on the 2020 mid-year population 
estimates for UK adults aged 18+ published by ONS. An additional second stage 
rim weight was applied to both data sets to yield an even blend within the final 
combined weighted data.
11 We observed some variation in response between online and telephone 
survey methods on the key question “Still thinking specifically about the period 
between 19 March – 30 June 2020, did your employer of your main job ask you 
to work while you were furloughed, or not?” The figure of 9% of furloughed 
employees who worked following a request from their employer is an aggregated 
result; separate figures for respondents interviewed by telephone and for those 
undertaking the survey online were 4% and 14% respectively. 
International comparison
12 We also engaged with our national audit counterparts in other countries to 
better understand the different ways in which their respective governments were 
implementing short-time working or wage subsidy schemes in response to the 
pandemic. See Appendix Three for more details.
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Limitations 
13 In reaching our independent views, we are aware of the following limitations 
to our review of HMRC’s employment schemes and the value for money 
conclusion we draw:
• We conducted our audit at a relatively early stage and the full impact of the 
schemes is not yet clear.
• We conducted all our feedback remotely and, in the context of the 
pandemic, could not supplement our fieldwork with site visits.
• Survey research draws on quota sampling techniques which cannot 
generally be used to make inferences about a wider population (see above). 
• The absence of a clear estimate of the nature and extent of fraud and error 
meant we were unable to definitively conclude on how well risks have been 
managed. HMRC expects to produce a more certain estimate, but not before 
the end of 2021, and we will need to consider that as part of any future work.
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International comparisons
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Figure 21
International Comparison
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ERC: 12 March to 
31 December 2020
PPP: 3 April to 
30 June 2020
Notes
1 All maximum monthly benefi ts and estimated total costs have been converted to pound sterling based on the exchange rates as at 
14 October 2020. Monthly benefi t fi gures have been converted to the per-month equivalent where necessary.
2 Some countries have subsequently extended their support schemes beyond the initial period. For example, the UK Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme was initially due to run only to 31 May but was subsequently extended to 31 October 2020.
3 Total spend fi gures have not been confi rmed for France.
4 The German Supreme Audit Institution told us in August that the Federal Employment Agency estimated €30 billion in spending would be 
attributable to increasing numbers of workers using the Kurzarbeit short-time work scheme throughout 2020.
5 In Ireland and the Netherlands, existing short-time work schemes were replaced by new wage subsidy schemes.
6 The ERC and PPP provide a benefi t to employers with the intention of mitigating layoffs. The PPP scheme provides a loan which may convert into 
a grant if employee retention conditions are met. The CARES Act 2020 also provided funding for states to establish short-time work programmes, 
however the US Government Accountability Offi ce told us that at 30 June 2020 no federal funding had been obligated for spending.
Sources: National Audit Offi ce analysis of data from the Supreme Audit Institutions contacted; Institute for Government report (2020): Coronavirus and 
unemployment: a fi ve-nation comparison; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report (2020): Job retention schemes 
during the COVID-19 lockdown and beyond; Governmental websites.
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Appendix Four
Evolution of HM Revenue & Customs’ employment 
support schemes
Figure 22
Comparison of Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Job Support Scheme (JSS)
Government support has changed over time
Notes
1 From August 2020, the employer has paid National Insurance Contributions and minimum pension contributions. Employers can top up 
employee salaries if they want. For all schemes, the government has capped the maximum level of support it provides.
2 For CJRS 2 and JSS, government support is based on the hours not worked by the employee. For CJRS 2, the level of support reduced
over time to 60% in October, the final month of that scheme.
3 Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
4 The Expanded JSS is for businesses legally required to close as a result of lockdown restrictions.
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Figure 23
Comparison of Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) 
and SEISS Extension
Government support has changed over time
Note
1 The maximum level of government support is also capped.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of government information
Self-Employment Income Support
Scheme 1st Grant (SEISS 1)
Self-Employment Income Support
Scheme 2nd Grant (SEISS 2)
Self-Employment Income Support
Scheme Extension (SEISS Extension)
from November
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